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ABSTRACT—An officer is entitled to qualified immunity when a 
reasonable officer would not have known that her conduct violated clearly 
established law. Courts disagree over whether and how an officer’s receipt 
of legal advice before acting supports the qualified immunity defense by 
showing that, based on the advice, a reasonable officer would have thought 
that her conduct would not violate clearly established law. This Article 
argues that legal advice should support the qualified immunity defense. It 
argues that when an officer asserts reliance on legal advice as supporting 
qualified immunity, a court should consider whether in the circumstances 
the officer was reasonable to rely on that legal advice, rather than analyzing 
the issue under a narrow “extraordinary circumstances” exception. It 
further proposes a detailed framework for assessing reasonableness, based 
on a synthesis of various circuits’ divergent approaches to this specific 
question, the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to qualified immunity, 
and the policies that drive the qualified immunity doctrine. This detailed 
framework for a searching reasonableness analysis is the best way to 
balance the imposition of liability for officers who violate clear law against 
the recognition that often the best course for a reasonable officer will be to 
seek and rely on a legal opinion about a difficult legal question.   
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Do you think it is at all pertinent . . . that the officers submitted the 
affidavit to support the warrant to Deputy District Attorney Jane 
Wilson, who reviewed it and signed off on it? . . . Is it relevant in any 
way? 
—Chief Justice John Roberts† 
INTRODUCTION 
A sheriff in North Dakota fires one of his deputies for opposing his 
reelection, but only after seeking advice from the county attorney and being 
told the termination would be legal.1 The fired deputy then sues the sheriff 
 
† Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012) (No. 10-
704) [hereinafter Messerschmidt Transcript]. 
1 Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2014).  
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, and the sheriff asserts the defense of qualified immunity.2 At 
summary judgment, the court must decide whether the sheriff violated 
clearly established law based on a complex analysis of the interaction 
between state employment law and the Supreme Court’s Pickering3–
Connick4 balancing test for the protection of public employee speech. In 
performing this analysis, the court must also consider whether and how the 
sheriff’s qualified immunity defense is supported by the county attorney’s 
legal advice.5 
During a traffic stop in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a police officer notices 
the car’s passenger is videotaping him.6 Believing that the taping violates 
the state’s Wiretap Act7 because the passenger was recording 
surreptitiously, the officer takes the passenger’s camera back to his unit and 
calls an assistant district attorney, who reviews the statute and tells the 
officer that the state Wiretap Act does prohibit the passenger’s conduct.8 
The officer then arrests the passenger; the charges are eventually dropped, 
but the prosecutor writes a memo stating the officer had probable cause for 
the seizure and arrest.9 The passenger then sues the officer under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for violating his First and Fourth Amendment rights. At summary 
judgment, the court must decide not only whether the officer’s conduct 
violated clearly established constitutional law, but also whether and how 
the assistant district attorney’s legal advice supports the police officer’s 
qualified immunity defense.10 
In these cases, and most close cases under § 1983, whether the 
government officer11 will be liable depends on whether a court accepts the 
officer’s qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity immunizes an 
officer from liability and suit unless the officer’s conduct violated clearly 
 
2 Id. 
3 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569–73 (1968). 
4 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).  
5 See Nord, 757 F.3d at 743 (citing Stanton v. Sims, 134 S.Ct. 3, 5 (2011) (“[Because of] the advice 
given by the Walsh County attorney . . ., Sheriff Wild could have logically and rationally believed that 
his decision to terminate Nord was well within the breathing room accorded him as a public official in 
making a reasonable, even if mistaken, judgment under the circumstances.”). 
6 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle (Kelly I), 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). [Editor’s Note: The 
Kelly cases cited in this Article have been numbered according to the Third Circuit’s designations for 
ease of reference.] 
7 Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Wiretap Act), 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 5701–82 (2014). 
8 Kelly I, 622 F.3d at 251–52.  
9 Id. at 252. 
10 See id. at 254–55.  
11 This Article uses “officer” to refer to any state or local government official or employee. 
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established law of which an objectively reasonable officer would have 
known.12 The question presented by these two example cases, and scores of 
other cases litigated in the federal courts, is whether and when an officer 
can support her qualified immunity defense by arguing that she reasonably 
relied on legal advice that her planned conduct would be lawful. 
This Article argues that legal advice should support an officer’s 
qualified immunity defense when the officer can show that an objectively 
reasonable officer would have relied on the lawyer’s advice to conclude 
that her intended conduct would not violate clearly established 
constitutional law, and thus trigger § 1983.13 This Article also proposes a 
specific framework for evaluating when an officer reasonably relied on 
legal advice, such that qualified immunity should follow. 
Part I gives general background on § 1983 litigation and more detailed 
background on qualified immunity doctrine, examining the evolution of 
qualified immunity doctrine and the circuits’ divergence and confusion 
about how the doctrine applies. Against this background and in the context 
of the circuits’ broader difficulties in applying qualified immunity, Part II 
examines courts’ and scholars’ division over the lawyers’ advice issue. The 
federal circuits are split over whether and how to weigh lawyers’ advice in 
qualified immunity analysis.14 Most circuits consider legal advice relevant, 
but a few suggest it is not.15 Courts that do consider legal advice relevant 
weigh it along a spectrum. Some consider it relevant to the basic qualified 
immunity inquiry into whether a reasonable officer in the circumstances 
would have known her conduct would violate clearly established law.16 
Others, however, consider legal advice only as a potential “extraordinary 
circumstance,” an exception that can establish immunity only in rare 
cases.17 Finally, courts who consider legal advice assign it varying weight 
in the analysis: some give it very little weight, some consider it a factor in a 
 
12 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  
13 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004).  
14 Research for this Article has identified at least sixty published circuit court opinions considering 
the question in some way (data on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). See infra Section 
II.B. and Table 1; see also MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 3:9, 
at 331 n.8 (3d ed. 2014) (“The courts are divided on the question of whether and under what 
circumstances the advice of counsel can establish extraordinary circumstances.”); MARTIN A. 
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9A.05[C] (2015), Westlaw 
SNETLCD (cataloging some circuit cases and their distinct approaches). 
15 See, e.g., In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[R]eliance upon advice of 
counsel . . . cannot be used to support the defense of qualified immunity.”).  
16 See, e.g., Cox, 391 F.3d at 35.  
17 See, e.g., V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 1987).  
DAWSON (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 10:38 PM 
110:525 (2016) Qualified Immunity for Lawyers’ Advice 
529 
“totality of the circumstances” approach,18 others say it “goes far to 
establish immunity,”19 and one court concludes that lawyers’ advice 
presumptively entitles the officer to immunity.20 
As also discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court has not yet specified 
how to figure legal advice into qualified immunity analysis, but it has 
suggested that it is “pertinent.”21 In Messerschmidt v. Millender,22 in 2012, 
the Court held that in the Fourth Amendment warrant search context, an 
attorney’s approval “provides further support” for the officer’s qualified 
immunity defense.23 The Court did not address, however, where legal 
advice fits into the doctrinal framework, how much weight it should carry, 
or how to analyze when reliance on legal advice is reasonable. Finally, 
while scholars have identified the disagreement over how lawyers’ advice 
affects qualified immunity analysis, there has not yet been a proposal for a 
comprehensive solution. Further, those solutions that have been offered 
have assumed (contrary to the arguments in this Article) that lawyers’ 
advice must be analyzed under Harlow’s “extraordinary circumstances”24 
exception. This Article proposes a systematic, detailed approach for 
analyzing this issue based on an analysis of all the circuit cases, 
consideration of how the issue fits within the Supreme Court’s modern 
qualified immunity test, and the guidance of Messerschmidt. 
In Part III, the Article argues that legal advice should be relevant to 
the qualified immunity defense, and that when an officer invokes legal 
advice to support her qualified immunity defense, a court should consider 
whether in the circumstances the officer was reasonable to rely on that 
legal advice, rather than analyzing the issue under an extraordinary 
circumstances exception. This approach is most consistent with the Court’s 
modern qualified immunity doctrine because the Court has discarded the 
extraordinary circumstances approach, and instead has focused qualified 
immunity analysis on the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct in light of 
established law and the circumstances of the particular case. This approach 
 
18 See, e.g., Cox, 391 F.3d at 35. 
19 See, e.g., Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kijonka v. 
Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004)); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1231 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (same); Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 2004) (same).  
20 Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010).  
21 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1250 (2012). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1249. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg all disagreed with this part of the Court’s 
decision. See id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1259–60 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer expressed no view on it. See id. at 1251 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
24 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 800, 819 (1982). 
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also better balances the policy of deterring official misconduct against that 
of preventing overdeterrence and unfairness to officers. It strikes a middle 
ground between an extraordinary circumstances approach, which ignores 
that often officers will be reasonable to trust a legal expert’s opinion over 
their own, and a presumption of immunity approach, which could give 
officers bad incentives to misuse lawyers’ advice as a shield to push the 
boundaries of the law.25 This reasonableness approach thus incentivizes 
officers to seek balanced legal advice on difficult problems26 by offering 
protection if they seek advice—but only when the officers are forthright, 
the circumstances make it reasonable to rely, and the officer actually 
follows the advice. 
To effect this desired balance between overdeterrence or unfairness 
and appropriate deterrence of misconduct, in Part IV the Article proposes a 
specific framework for evaluating reasonableness based on a synthesis of 
the circuits’ divergent approaches. Under this framework, a court should 
first determine whether the officer gave the attorney all the relevant facts, 
whether the attorney actually advised the officer that the conduct would be 
constitutional, and whether the officer actually followed the lawyer’s 
advice. If not, the legal advice should not support immunity. Further, the 
officer should bear the burden of proof on these questions. If these 
threshold requirements are met, the court should then balance several 
factors to decide whether an objectively reasonable officer would have 
relied on the lawyer’s advice. These include (1) whether the advice was 
specific and detailed, (2) whether the lawyer had authority and expertise to 
give the advice, (3) the extent to which the lawyer was independent from 
the officer, (4) whether the issue presented would be difficult or novel for 
an officer in the defendant’s position, and (5) the closeness of the 
underlying question of whether the law was clearly established. 
This proposed framework of threshold questions and balancing factors 
is designed to identify cases in which reliance on legal advice would have 
been reasonable, based on factors already recognized as relevant in the 
decisions of circuit courts. In addition, the proposed approach is also 
broadly consistent with common law on the advice-of-counsel defense, 
which coheres with the Supreme Court’s general approach of consulting 
 
25 See, e.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“To make their views relevant is to enable those teammates [prosecutors and police officers] (whether 
acting in good or bad faith) to confer immunity on each other for unreasonable conduct . . . .”). 
26 See, e.g., Kelly I, 622 F.3d at 255 (noting the desirability of a rule that encourages officers to 
seek advice on difficult questions); Messerschmidt Transcript supra note †, at 43 (Chief Justice Roberts 
asking whether the rule should encourage officers to seek legal advice). 
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(but not mimicking) common law rules in crafting qualified immunity 
doctrine under § 1983.27 
The Conclusion summarizes the Article’s main argument, and also 
argues that if the Court takes up the question of how to figure lawyers’ 
advice into qualified immunity analysis, it should clarify the doctrine by 
dispensing with the vestigial extraordinary circumstances exception and 
explaining the proper interaction of reasonableness and circumstance in the 
qualified immunity analysis. 
I. SECTION 1983 AND THE QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
Section 1983 allows a private individual to sue state and local 
government officials, as well as local governments, for officials’ violations 
of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights under color of state law.28 
Section 1983 suits are, and for decades have been, the primary vehicle for 
private enforcement of federal constitutional rights against state and local 
officials and governments.29 Qualified immunity is a defense available to 
individual government officers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.30 This Part 
reviews the § 1983 doctrine generally, and then explains in detail the 
origins, current doctrine, and policy underpinnings of qualified immunity. 
A. Section 1983 Liability and Defenses 
Section 1983 was originally enacted after the Civil War as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871.31 It imposes civil liability on “person[s]” who 
deprive others of constitutional or statutory rights “under color of” law.32 
 
27 See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012) (noting that the Court has interpreted 
§ 1983 in light of common law tort principles of defenses and immunities). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The statute also allows some suits for violations of plaintiffs’ federal 
statutory rights. E.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). This Article focuses on constitutional 
violations as “the most frequently litigated claims” under § 1983. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes 
at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 728 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
29 Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After 
Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473, 1502 (2013) (referring to § 1983 as “the principal means of 
enforcing constitutional rights”). 
30 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (recognizing for the first time the qualified 
immunity defense to § 1983 lawsuits).  
31 Enforcement Act of 1871, Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The law was also known as the 
Ku Klux Klan Act because its goal was to stop racial terrorism in the South.  
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
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For nearly 100 years after its enactment, the statute lay dormant,33 until in 
Monroe v. Pape34 the Supreme Court revived it as a meaningful constraint 
on state and local government officials by holding that § 1983 could be 
used to sue officials for actions taken under the authority of their office, 
even when those actions were not required or authorized by state or local 
law.35 This holding created modern § 1983 litigation36 and led to the Court’s 
development of a complex doctrine to govern liability and defenses under 
the statute.37 
Monroe, together with the Warren Court’s expansion of substantive 
constitutional rights,38 led to a proliferation of civil rights suits against state 
and local officials.39 Among the many contexts in which § 1983 is used to 
vindicate civil rights, two in particular are worth mentioning as instances in 
which the lawyers’ advice issue most often arises. Plaintiffs often use the 
statute to sue for damages arising out of allegedly unconstitutional searches 
or seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.40 And government 
employee plaintiffs often use § 1983 to challenge their firings as a violation 
of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,41 their free 
speech rights under the First Amendment,42 or both.43 
 
33 Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute 
Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (1985) (describing the post-Reconstruction 
disuse and retraction of civil rights laws).  
34 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
35 Id. at 187 (holding that government officers could be held liable under § 1983 for official 
conduct even when that conduct was not directed or authorized by state law). 
36 See Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. 
Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 191 (1977) (explaining that the “landmark” decision in Monroe increased 
the number of § 1983 suits). 
37 See Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 
1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 823 (2003) (noting § 1983’s “uniquely complicated (one 
might say Byzantine) liability scheme” (footnote omitted)).  
38 See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the “Unhappy History” Theory of 
Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. REV. 737, 757. 
39 See Wells v. Ward, 470 F.2d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting “[t]he proliferation of litigation 
resulting from the expanded use of § 1983” (quoting Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 
1971))); Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 
34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003 (2002) (“The explosion in litigation under § 1983 is often traced to the 
Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape . . . .”); Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of 
Constitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 489, 499–500 (1999) (“In contrast to the small number of § 1983 cases brought before Monroe, by 
1977 over 20,000 § 1983 suits were filed per year.”).  
40 E.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1241 (2012) (involving suit against officers 
for allegedly unlawful search).  
41 E.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 926 (1997) (involving suspension of a university police 
officer without a hearing).  
42 E.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2376 (2014) (involving termination of a youth program 
director for truthful testimony at public corruption trial).  
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Section 1983 exposes defendant officers to money damages imposed 
personally against them.44 Concerns about imposing personal liability on 
government officers and changes in the Court’s composition led the Court 
to develop immunity doctrines to protect officers.45 In developing these 
doctrines, the Court sought to balance the statutory purpose of remedying 
and deterring constitutional wrongs against the desire not to impede or 
overdeter officers’ performance of their duties through unfair imposition of 
liability.46 
The Court has developed two main categories of official immunity—
absolute and qualified. Absolute immunity provides total immunity from 
suit under § 1983 to government officers performing legislative,47 judicial,48 
and prosecutorial49 functions, no matter how blatantly unconstitutional their 
actions.50 In reading absolute immunity into the statute, as in other aspects 
of interpreting § 1983, the Court has looked to common law, both as it 
stood in 187151 and as it developed since.52 Under the Court’s functional 
approach to absolute immunity, immunity depends on the nature of the 
action, not the officer’s job title.53 Under this “functional approach,” for 
example, prosecutors have absolute immunity for actions taken “in their 
role as advocates,”54 but are entitled only to qualified immunity when 
 
43 E.g., Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 712 (10th Cir. 1989) (involving due process 
and free speech claims arising out of the discharge of a police officer for testimony and conduct related 
to judicial corruption trial).  
44 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978). In most cases, however, government 
employers indemnify officers for that liability. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 885, 911–13 (2014) (describing an empirical study concluding that essentially all § 1983 
judgments and settlements are paid by governments, not officers). 
45 Cf. Christopher E. Smith, The Impact of New Justices: The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal 
Justice Policy, 30 AKRON L. REV. 55, 65 (1996) (tracing how changes in the Court’s composition drove 
changes in jurisprudence). 
46 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two 
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 
perform their duties reasonably.”). 
47 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).  
48 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
49 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).  
50 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (holding that a judge was entitled to 
absolute immunity even though the judge ordered unconsented sterilization of a minor).  
51 Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (2012) (stating that the Court begins by looking to “the 
common law as it existed when Congress passed § 1983 in 1871” (citing Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 
914, 920 (1984)).  
52 See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 
(1997); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980). 
53 See, e.g., Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1503; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). 
54 Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1503.  
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performing nonprosecutorial functions,55 such as giving officers legal 
advice about the legality of a planned search.56 
The other sort of officer immunity, qualified immunity, is more 
limited and applies to protect the officer only when the officer acts 
reasonably.57 Though qualified immunity is less than absolute, it is still 
quite robust, protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law,”58 and the trend over time has been towards 
making it stronger.59 Most of this Article is about qualified immunity, but 
before focusing on qualified immunity doctrine, it is helpful to briefly note 
two other points that support this Article’s arguments for considering 
lawyers’ advice as relevant to qualified immunity analysis. 
One is that the Court has held that § 1983 allows suits against local 
and municipal government entities, as well as individual officers.60 Local 
governments are liable, however, only when plaintiffs can show that a 
policy, custom, or action of the municipal or local government caused the 
constitutional violation committed by the individual officer.61 Under this 
approach, a municipal or local government may be liable when its express 
policy or informal custom causes officers to violate the constitution,62 or 
when an official with policymaking authority for the municipality caused 
the constitutional violation.63 Further, when a municipality is responsible 
for a violation under these doctrines, it has no qualified immunity defense.64 
In the lawyers’ advice scenario, this means that local government could be 
liable if (1) it had a policy or custom of having its lawyers give blanket 
 
55 E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276–77 (1993) (holding that there is no absolute 
immunity for a prosecutor’s statements at a press conference).  
56 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (stating that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute 
immunity for legal advice to police); see also Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a lawyer is not immune for incorrect advice to an officer about probable cause for arrest).  
57 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987). 
58 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  
59 See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 273–75 (2006) 
(arguing that Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are shifting qualified immunity towards absolute 
immunity). 
60 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). States, however, are immune from 
§ 1983 suits because they are not § 1983 “persons.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 
(1989). 
61 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (rejecting respondeat superior liability for local governments).  
62 Id.  
63 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (holding that a city may be held liable 
for a decision made by an official with authority to make policy for the city).  
64 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). Justices and scholars have criticized 
the confusing patchwork of municipal liability rules. See, e.g., Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397, 431 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing municipal liability law under § 1983); 
Wasserman, supra note 37, at 823–26 (noting the difficulties caused by the complex interaction 
between officer liability and municipal liability doctrines).  
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sanction to officers without regard to the true state of the law to bolster 
those officers’ qualified immunity defenses, which caused officers to 
violate rights; or if (2) the lawyer giving the advice was sufficiently high 
ranking to be a policymaker for the local government, so that the lawyer’s 
approval amounted to municipal policy authorizing the violation.65 
The second point is that the Court’s interpretation of § 1983, and 
particularly its qualified immunity doctrine, is largely judge-made,66 and 
has frequently been revised and reversed by the Court since 1961.67 The 
rules and their changes are generally driven not by the text of the statute,68 
which is relatively brief, but by reliance on a shifting mix of legislative 
history,69 common law analogs,70 and policy considerations.71 The result has 
been that § 1983 doctrine, and in particular, qualified immunity doctrine, is 
widely considered to be complex, confusing, and sometimes 
 
65 See infra Section IV.B.1 (arguing that legal advice from a high-ranking official is a factor 
supporting an officer’s claim that it was reasonable to rely on the advice).  
66 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1536–
37 (1987) (noting “statutory common law” development of § 1983 doctrine). 
67 Since the birth of modern § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, the Court has reversed its position on a 
number of fundamental doctrinal points. These include reversing its position to allow liability for 
municipal and local governments under § 1983, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961)); changing from a subjective to an objective approach to qualified immunity, 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (dispensing with the subjective qualified immunity 
inquiry developed in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), and used through Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975)); and switching the qualified immunity analysis from a “rigid order of battle” 
to a discretionary approach that allows courts to consider whether law was “clearly established” before 
deciding whether the Constitution was violated, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235–36 (2009) 
(reversing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).  
68 Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of 
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 54–57 (1989) (noting the limits of the text in resolving interpretive questions 
about the § 1983 cause of action). 
69 See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176–86, 224–29 (debate between majority and Justice Frankfurter 
in dissent over interpretation of § 1983 based on legislative history).  
70 See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502–03 (2012) (describing the Court’s approach of 
consulting common law to shape contours of immunity under § 1983); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 644–45 (1987) (“[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and 
should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law.”); see also Michael Wells, 
Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (noting 
inconsistencies in Court’s use of and deviation from common law principles).  
71 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Once it is 
established that the common law of 1871 provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should 
turn to the policies underlying § 1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies.”); see 
also Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 695, 
698 (1997) (“Overall, the Court’s methodology . . . has been highly oriented toward legislative intent 
and policy, with the common law playing an important role.”); Beermann, supra note 68, at 54 (noting 
that the author and other commentators see the Court’s methods as “ad hoc, designed to allow the Court 
to rationalize any outcome in any case”); John M. Greabe, A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 
25 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 205 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has openly acknowledged its 
willingness to rewrite the text of section 1983 to create a regime that ‘better’ balances competing policy 
considerations than does the actual law that Congress passed.”). 
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contradictory.72 The Court’s demonstrated willingness to change the 
doctrine supports this Article’s argument that adoption of the proposed test 
is feasible; the consensus that the doctrine is complex and confusing 
supports this Article’s argument that the proposed test is better because it is 
simpler. 
B. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine—Origins, Evolution, 
and Policies 
Qualified immunity protects an officer from suit73 and liability for 
violating the law when the officer mistakenly but reasonably believed that 
his conduct was legal.74 It only applies to officers performing discretionary 
government functions,75 and the officer must raise qualified immunity as an 
affirmative defense.76 Once the defense is raised, however, most circuits 
hold that the plaintiff has the burden to show that the official’s conduct 
violated clearly established constitutional law.77 A vast literature on 
 
72 E.g., Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified 
Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000) (“Wading through the doctrine of 
qualified immunity is one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate 
court judges routinely face.”). 
73 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001) (emphasizing that the immunity is from suit, not 
just from liability).  
74 See Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (per curiam) (“Qualified immunity gives government 
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments . . . .” (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011))). 
75 Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263–67 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the discretionary 
function requirement). This Article addresses only situations in which the discretionary function 
requirement is met.  
76 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639–41 (1980). 
77 E.g., Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting plaintiff’s burden); see also 
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in 
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 91–92 (1997) (analyzing the circuits’ approaches to 
burden of persuasion on qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage); Kenneth Duvall, Burdens 
of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 143–45 (2012) (summarizing the circuits’ 
approaches to the burden of proof question). 
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qualified immunity has comprehensively summarized,78 critiqued,79 and 
even sometimes defended the doctrine.80 
The Court’s development of qualified immunity doctrine has aimed to 
balance the policy of redressing and deterring constitutional wrongs against 
the policy of not unduly deterring government officials from the zealous 
performance of their duties.81 The trend in the cases over the past several 
decades has been towards favoring the latter policy by making qualified 
immunity harder to overcome.82 Relatedly, the Court has also refined the 
rules so that it is easier for courts to resolve the defense at summary 
judgment83—a change driven by the Court’s emphasis that the defense is a 
defense from suit and that exposure to extended litigation disserves the 
policy of avoiding undue deterrence of officials.84 
The Supreme Court recognized the qualified immunity defense fairly 
soon after the birth of modern § 1983 litigation in Monroe v. Pape. The 
Court drew the defense from common law principles of official immunity,85 
and has continued to consult common law in defining and refining qualified 
 
78 E.g., Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: 
Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013). 
79 E.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 
590–91 (1998) (critiquing qualified immunity doctrine by comparison with criminal law concepts of 
fair notice); Beermann, supra note 71, at 698 (criticizing the Court’s reliance on common law 
concepts); Wells, supra note 70, at 159–60 (same); Chen, supra note 59, at 270 (criticizing the 
doctrine’s approach to resolving factual issues); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for 
Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 247–64 (2013) (arguing for a reconstruction of qualified 
immunity doctrine); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial 
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 77 (1989) (arguing that the 
Rehnquist Court’s approach misbalances constitutional protections and government efficiency).  
80 E.g., Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity 
and the Elaboration of Constitutional Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond), 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 643, 643 (2011) (defending current doctrine as generally a “well-functioning procedural 
framework”); Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: The Policy Bases 
of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 665, 
667–68 (1992) (arguing that current qualified immunity doctrine generally is well designed). 
81 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 
408 (1997); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).  
82 See Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 78, at 657 (“[T]he Roberts Court is strongly 
pro-immunity.”); Chen, supra note 59, at 273–75 (arguing that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are 
transforming qualified immunity into absolute immunity).  
83 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (allowing interlocutory appeal from 
denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 800, 815–16 
(1982) (shifting to an objective standard to make the qualified immunity issue easier to resolve on 
summary judgment). 
84 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) 
(per curiam).  
85 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556–57 (1967) (recognizing qualified immunity by analogy to 
common law defenses of good faith and probable cause). 
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immunity’s scope and application.86 The Court has also, however, deviated 
from common law principles in significant ways, for example, by changing 
the qualified immunity analysis to an objective analysis so that the defense 
could be more easily and frequently resolved at summary judgment.87 
Early qualified immunity doctrine, drawing on the common law “good 
faith” defense, incorporated both objective and subjective components—
qualified immunity could be overcome either if the officer “knew or 
reasonably should have known” his actions would violate the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights, or if he acted with malicious intent to deprive the 
plaintiff of constitutional rights.88 The Court changed approaches, however, 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, holding that the qualified immunity test should be 
purely (or almost purely) objective.89 The Court’s main rationale was to 
make it easier to resolve the qualified immunity defense at summary 
judgment—the subjective prong generated too many fact questions that 
would allow a case to proceed to trial.90 
Harlow therefore held that “officials performing discretionary 
functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”91 Harlow thus 
fundamentally changed qualified immunity by making the analysis 
primarily objective. Its most important holding was that qualified immunity 
should be determined by examining whether a reasonable officer would 
have known that their conduct would violate clearly established rights.92 It 
also suggested a presumption that a “reasonably competent” official should 
know clearly established law.93 Finally, the Court suggested, in dicta, an 
extraordinary circumstances exception to this presumption: “[I]f the official 
pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that 
 
86 See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (2012) (noting that the Court consults the 
“‘general principles of tort immunities and defenses’ applicable at common law” (quoting Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976))); see also Beermann, supra note 71, at 698 (critiquing the Court’s 
approach to using common law); Wells, supra note 70, at 160 (same). 
87 Harlow, 457 U.S at 815–16 (shifting from common law’s subjective approach to a purely 
objective approach); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644–45 (1987) (“[W]e have never 
suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the 
often arcane rules of the common law.”).  
88 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557 (focusing on 
defendant officers’ subjective belief that their actions were constitutional).  
89 457 U.S. at 816. 
90 Id. at 815–16 (“The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved 
incompatible with our admonition . . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.”).  
91 Id. at 818.  
92 See id. 
93 Id. at 818–19. 
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he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the 
defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on 
objective factors.”94 
The Court’s statement about extraordinary circumstances is confusing 
because it simultaneously suggests that the inquiry should be subjective 
(“he neither knew”) and objective (“would turn primarily on objective 
factors”).95 Further, the Court has never clarified its dicta about 
extraordinary circumstances, or for that matter, mentioned it again in a 
majority opinion.96 Some circuits have developed extraordinary 
circumstances case law, including in cases involving lawyers’ advice,97 but 
the Court itself has never referred back to the concept. 
Instead, since Harlow, the Court has progressed steadily towards 
analyzing qualified immunity by examining whether the officer’s conduct 
was reasonable in the particular circumstances the officer faced.98 In 
Anderson v. Creighton, the Court emphasized that claims an officer’s 
conduct violated clearly established law—of which a reasonable officer 
would have known—must be evaluated at the appropriate “level of 
generality.”99 Cases since Anderson have repeated this theme.100 Thus, for a 
constitutional violation to be clearly established, prior precedents must 
have been sufficiently similar such that they clearly established the 
“contours of the right”101 in such a way that a reasonable officer would have 
known their conduct in the circumstances would conflict with those 
precedents.102 So it is not enough, for example, to say that any search that a 
court concludes violated the Fourth Amendment also violates clearly 
established law because the Fourth Amendment clearly requires probable 
 
94 Id. at 819.  
95 See id. 
96 John M. Greabe, Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring Good Faith Principle and the Harlow 
Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be Married, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 11 (2012) 
(noting that “Harlow’s mysterious ‘extraordinary circumstances’ dictum” has never been cited by a 
subsequent majority opinion of the Court, and instead immediately disappeared from the Court’s 
articulation of the test). 
97 See infra Part II. 
98 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (“The principles of qualified immunity shield 
an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies 
with the law.”); Greabe, supra note 96, at 11 (noting the Court’s “many subsequent indications that the 
qualified immunity analysis is wholly objective”).  
99 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
100 See, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Anderson’s 
reasoning); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093–94 (2012) (same); Brosseau v. Haugen, 
543 U.S. 194, 198–99 (2004) (per curiam) (same); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–15 (1999) 
(same).  
101 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
102 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198–99.  
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cause; instead a court must inquire whether it would have been clear at the 
time that probable cause was lacking in the context of that particular 
case.103 On the other hand, precedents need not be factually identical to 
clearly establish the law; it is enough that the body of precedents at the 
time of the conduct should have made the officer aware that the conduct 
would be illegal.104 
Thus, the analysis seeks sufficiently similar precedent to give an 
officer “fair warning”105 or “fair notice”106 that their conduct would be 
illegal, and generally presumes that if such precedent exists, a reasonable 
officer should know it.107 The Court has also prescribed rules on what level 
and weight of decisional law can “clearly establish” law to provide fair 
notice. Supreme Court decisions are clearly sufficient.108 Decisions of the 
officer’s “home circuit” are thought sufficient by the circuits themselves,109 
and assumed sufficient by the Supreme Court.110 A consensus of persuasive 
circuit authority may also suffice if there is no controlling authority.111 
District court decisions are insufficient.112 
The Court has also provided alternative phrases to capture the essence 
of the test and how it protects officers. The Court has said “the focus is on 
whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful,”113 or 
whether the officer had “fair warning” that he could be held liable for his 
actions.114 Similarly, the Court said that qualified immunity “gives 
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
 
103 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640–41.  
104 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (noting that the test does not require 
a case “directly on point,” but that “existing precedent must have placed the . . . question beyond 
debate”); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002) (rejecting qualified immunity despite lack of 
factually identical case).  
105 Hope, 536 U.S. at 739–40.  
106 Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).  
108 See, e.g., Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014) (looking to decisions “of this Court” to 
determine whether right was clearly established); Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990 (2012) (per 
curiam) (same).  
109 See, e.g., Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2013) (looking to circuit decisions 
in determining whether law was clearly established); Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (same); Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1425 (10th Cir. 1997) (same).  
110 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381–83 (2014) (analyzing Eleventh Circuit 
precedents to determine whether an Alabama official’s conduct violated clearly established law). But 
see Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam) (merely “[a]ssuming for the sake of 
argument that a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law”).  
111 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).  
112 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (“[A] district judge’s ipse dixit of a 
holding . . . falls far short of what is necessary absent controlling authority.”). 
113 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam). 
114 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002). 
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judgments,”115 and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.”116 Across these various verbal formulations, the 
trend has been for the Court to drive the analysis towards an assessment of 
reasonableness under the circumstances by comparison with extant clearly 
established law.117 The Court emphasizes that the touchstone of the analysis 
is objective reasonableness,118 and rejects attempts to inject subjectivity into 
the defense.119 
In addition to shifting the substantive focus of the analysis, the Court 
has also shaped qualified immunity doctrine to resolve the issue at 
summary judgment when possible and streamline adjudication of the 
defense.120 Furthermore, in making the inquiry purely objective to facilitate 
resolution on summary judgment,121 the Court has made summary judgment 
denials of qualified immunity interlocutorily reviewable as collateral 
orders, again to ensure that an officer may vindicate his immunity defense 
before trial.122 Finally, the Court has recently shifted away from requiring 
lower courts to always decide the constitutional merits question first in a 
rigid “order of battle,”123 to allowing courts to skip to the “clearly 
established” question.124 The Court made this change to allow lower courts 
to avoid unnecessary work, and the decision of difficult constitutional 
questions, when a case is more easily resolved under the “clearly 
established” prong.125 
 
115 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085.  
116 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  
117 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). The inquiry focuses on the state of the 
law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).  
118 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (noting that qualified 
immunity analysis “generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in 
light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken” (quoting Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 639)). 
119 See Greabe, supra note 96, at 11 (noting that the Court has consistently maintained that the test 
is objective rather than subjective).  
120 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“[W]e have made clear that the ‘driving 
force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘“insubstantial 
claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.” (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 n.2)). 
121 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
122 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527–30 (1985). 
123 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
124 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.  
125 Id. at 236–38. The Saucier to Pearson shift was important for the application of qualified 
immunity doctrine, and has been extensively analyzed and criticized. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (arguing in favor of 
the merits-first approach); James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: 
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1617 (2011) (arguing 
that Pearson leaves rights undefined and encourages courts to “validate constitutionally dubious official 
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In sum, under current law, the Supreme Court, and most circuits, 
analyze qualified immunity using a two-step test outlined in Pearson:  
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or 
shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff 
has satisfied the first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was 
“clearly established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.126  
After Pearson, courts may skip to the second step when doing so will allow 
the court to quickly dispose of the plaintiff’s claims. A few circuits also 
add a third step: “[W]hether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to 
indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in 
light of the clearly established constitutional rights.”127 These courts note 
that the third step does not substantively change the test,128 but their 
articulation of the third step does clarify that the present test focuses on the 
objective legal reasonableness of the official’s actions in light of what the 
evidence shows about the particular circumstances of the case. 
Qualified immunity analysis, at least in close cases, thus involves a 
careful and complex129 comparison of official conduct in the case at hand to 
conduct held unconstitutional in precedents that are both sufficiently 
similar and of sufficient precedential weight.130 Moreover, since the test 
presumes a reasonable officer knows clearly established law, and exposes 
an officer to liability if they violate clearly established law, the test also 
presumes that a hypothetical reasonable officer would evaluate their 
intended conduct in light of the decisional law of the Supreme Court, as 
well as probably their home circuit and the “consensus” of other circuits. 
This presumption is likely a fiction, at least to the extent it presumes that 
most government officials (e.g., police officers or school principals) are 
 
action”). The wisdom of that shift is not important to this Article, other than to show that the Court has 
modified qualified immunity doctrine to allow lower courts to more efficiently resolve qualified 
immunity cases.  
126 555 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted). Pearson reversed Saucier’s holding that the steps had to be 
taken in order, but reaffirmed them as the basic components of the analysis. Id. at 240–42. 
127 Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Feathers v. 
Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 
227, 234 (1st Cir. 2007); Karen M. Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly 
Established” and What’s Not, 24 Touro L. Rev. 501, 510–12 (2008) (collecting and critiquing cases 
from “third step” courts). 
128 See, e.g., Sueiro Vázquez, 494 F.3d at 234 (noting that the First Circuit’s three-step test and 
other circuits’ two-step test “address[] the same issues”).  
129 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law, What’s Wrong with Qualified 
Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 854 (2010) (describing the doctrine as a source of “much confusion 
and instability”). 
130 E.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381–83 (2014); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243–44; Nord v. 
Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 739–42 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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aware of the latest decisional developments in constitutional law.131 
However, the fiction creates incentives for officers to act in conformance 
with the law, and imposes a minimum standard of competence and legal 
compliance beyond which an officer will be punished and a plaintiff will be 
compensated.132 
II. COURTS’ DIVIDED APPROACHES TO LEGAL ADVICE IN QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY ANALYSIS 
A special scenario arises in qualified immunity cases when the officer 
argues that a lawyer’s advice led the officer reasonably to believe her 
conduct would not violate clearly established law. This Part explains and 
gives examples of this scenario. It then examines and critiques the circuits’ 
division over whether and how to give weight to lawyers’ advice, and 
considers the Supreme Court’s opinion in Messerschmidt, both for insight 
into the correct approach and to show the Court’s interest in the question. 
Finally, it surveys scholars’ and students’ work to show that, while the 
division has been noted, a comprehensive analytical framework has not 
been proposed, and that most authors assume lawyers’ advice must be 
analyzed under the extraordinary circumstances exception—a view this 
Article challenges. 
A. The Lawyers’ Advice Scenario 
The specific scenario addressed by this Article arises when an officer 
acts in a way that violates or potentially violates the constitution133 after 
being advised by a lawyer134 that the conduct is constitutional. The situation 
presents a special dilemma because the qualified immunity test focuses on 
whether a reasonable officer would have known her conduct would violate 
clearly established law, and while it generally presumes that a reasonable 
officer should know clearly established law,135 sometimes lawyers’ advice 
 
131 See Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 535 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he statement in Harlow that 
reasonably competent public officials know clearly established law[] is a legal fiction.” (quoting 
Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2005) (Hartz, J., dissenting) (second alteration in 
original))). 
132 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (suggesting that the doctrine is intended to 
punish officers who are incompetent as well as those who knowingly violate the law).  
133 After Pearson, the situation can also arise if a court chooses to skip to analyzing the 
reasonableness/clearly established prong without deciding the constitutional merits question. See 
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.  
134 In most cases, the lawyer will also be a government employee, but in rare cases the lawyer may 
be a private lawyer or outside counsel. See Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 
830 F.2d 1487, 1489, 1495 (8th Cir. 1987). 
135 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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can create a situation in which an officer reasonably but mistakenly relies 
on the advice to believe that her conduct will comport with clearly 
established law. 
The most common context where lawyers’ advice has been invoked as 
a basis for qualified immunity is in Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
cases.136 The issue often arises when a police officer consults a prosecutor 
or other attorney for advice about whether there is probable cause to search 
or arrest.137 After being advised that the search or seizure is lawful, the 
officer takes the planned action, and then is sued by the plaintiff for a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The scenario can arise both when the 
officer seeks a warrant138 and when the officer wants to conduct a 
warrantless search or seizure.139 It can occur in civil as well as criminal 
contexts,140 or may involve officers’ involvement in private parties’ 
property disputes.141 Often, the Fourth Amendment claim may be combined 
with other constitutional claims.142 
Another fairly common scenario presenting the lawyer’s advice issue 
is termination of a government employee.143 Superiors may wish to fire a 
government employee, sometimes based on the employee’s speech or 
political affiliation.144 Before firing the employee, the officer seeks legal 
 
136 At least thirty cases consider the issue in this context. The citations below give examples, but a 
full list is omitted in the interest of space (data on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
137 See, e.g., Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010). 
138 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012). 
139 See, e.g., Forman v. Richmond Police Dep’t, 104 F.3d 950, 960 (7th Cir. 1997). 
140 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1997) (child welfare dispute); V–1 
Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (environmental 
enforcement). 
141 See, e.g., Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 302–03 (6th Cir. 2011) (involving officers assisting 
a landlord’s seizure of property during the course of eviction); Stevens v. Rose, 298 F.3d 880, 881–82 
(9th Cir. 2002) (involving arrest in civil dispute over car keys); Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 
246–47 (4th Cir. 1998) (deputy executing a warrant that allowed a private person to search a house). 
142 See, e.g., Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2004) (First and 
Fourth Amendment claims arising out of arrests at an abortion protest); L.A. Police Protective League 
v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 1990) (First and Fourth Amendment claims arising out of a search 
of an officer’s garage and his subsequent firing). 
143 See, e.g., Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2014) (termination of deputy 
sheriff); Moss v. Martin, 614 F.3d 707, 708 (7th Cir. 2010) (termination of Illinois Department of 
Transportation employee); Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (termination 
of senior-center director); Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 229–30 (1st Cir. 
2007) (political termination of opponents to new Puerto Rico administration); Gilbrook v. City of 
Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (termination of firefighter); L.A. Police Protective 
League, 907 F.2d at 883 (termination of police officer); Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 711 
(10th Cir. 1989) (termination of police officer). This list is once again illustrative, not exhaustive—there 
are at least seventeen circuit cases involving lawyers’ advice in the context of employee discipline or 
termination (data on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
144 See, e.g., Nord, 757 F.3d at 738. 
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advice about whether the firing is allowed by law.145 The lawyer advises the 
officer the firing is legal, the employee is fired, and then the employee sues 
under § 1983 raising claims of deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment 
procedural due process,146 First Amendment violations,147 or both.148 
In each of these common scenarios, the underlying constitutional law 
is highly fact-sensitive in application149—perhaps explaining why these 
scenarios are the ones in which the lawyer’s advice scenario most often 
arises. But the issue also arises in other less common situations, and has 
been litigated in dozens of reported circuit court opinions.150 Moreover, 
theoretically, the problem could arise in most § 1983 lawsuits, except ones 
where the claim inherently arises in contexts where an officer has to make a 
split-second decision without time to seek legal advice—such as most 
excessive force cases.151 
Two similar situations sometimes coincide with the lawyers’ advice 
scenario,152 but are analytically distinct. One is the “following orders” 
scenario, in which courts consider whether the officer’s qualified immunity 
defense is supported by the fact that superiors ordered or approved the 
 
145 See, e.g., Melton, 879 F.2d at 730–31. 
146 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 926 (1997) (involving a suspension without a hearing 
of a university police officer). 
147 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2376 (2014) (involving the termination of a youth 
program director for truthful testimony at a public corruption trial). 
148 See, e.g., Melton, 879 F.2d at 712 (involving due process and free speech claims arising out of 
the discharge of a police officer for testimony and conduct related to a judicial corruption trial). 
149 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the special problems of 
applying the test in “settings that invite balancing tests” and are “fact-dependent”); Melton, 879 F.2d at 
728–29 (noting “how difficult it is to apply Harlow in the setting of Pickering balancing” because of the 
“fact-specific nature” of the test).  
150 See, e.g., Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 2006) (due process violations in 
child removal proceedings); Suboh v. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); 
Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners’ rights); Walters v. Grossheim, 
990 F.2d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Tanner v. Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(same); Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2001) (proper interpretation of 
territorial election law); Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(land development regulation); Swanson v. Powers, 937 F.2d 965, 966 (4th Cir. 1991) (unconstitutional 
tax collection).  
151 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (noting that officers must make 
split-second decisions in excessive force cases, and that courts should not evaluate these cases from the 
perspective of “the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 
(1989))). It is possible to imagine, however, that the issue could arise even in an excessive force case, if, 
for example, lawyers were consulted before the police determined to use force to end a hostage situation 
or siege.  
152 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012) (raising, in the same case, 
the lawyers’ advice issue, the following orders issue, and the neutral magistrate issue). 
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officer’s allegedly illegal actions.153 This shares with the lawyers’ advice 
scenario the aspect of external influence, but differs in that lawyers’ advice, 
unlike superior orders, specifically concerns the legality of the officer’s 
planned conduct and so bears more closely on whether a reasonable officer 
would have known that conduct would violate the law. 
Another related but different scenario is the approval of a warrant by a 
neutral magistrate.154 The Court has said that approval by a magistrate may 
suggest that an officer would be reasonable to believe there is probable 
cause for the search,155 but has held that an officer still may be liable 
despite a magistrate’s approval when it should have been obvious to a 
reasonable officer that there was no probable cause for the warrant.156 The 
magistrate approval scenario sometimes coincides with the lawyers’ advice 
scenario,157 but there are many scenarios under the Fourth Amendment,158 as 
well as almost all scenarios under other constitutional provisions,159 where 
an officer may seek legal advice about their actions but does not seek a 
court order before undertaking them. Approval by a neutral magistrate is 
likely stronger evidence of the officer’s reasonableness than lawyers’ 
advice because a judge is neutral, while a lawyer consulted by an officer 
may have incentive to favor the officer in the analysis.160 
B. The Circuits’ Divided Approaches to Lawyers’ Advice in 
Qualified Immunity Analysis 
There is a deep and wide circuit split over how lawyers’ advice fits 
into qualified immunity analysis, with three main bases of disagreement. 
The first is whether lawyers’ advice is relevant to qualified immunity 
analysis at all. The second is whether lawyers’ advice is relevant to 
deciding whether a reasonable officer would have known the conduct 
violated clearly established law,161 or instead as an extraordinary 
 
153 See, e.g., Mark W.S. Hobel, Note, “So Vast an Area of Legal Irresponsibility”? The Superior 
Orders Defense and Good Faith Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 574 (2011) 
(considering this issue in the context of international law and the “War on Terror”). 
154 See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986). 
155 E.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249–50.  
156 E.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004); Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 
157 E.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249.  
158 E.g., Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010) (officer consulted attorney before making 
warrantless arrest).  
159 E.g., Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 896 (6th Cir. 2006) (termination of 
employee based on attorney advice).  
160 For example, in the warrant scenario, the prosecutor is part of the same “team” as the officer, 
while the judge is not. E.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249. 
161 This Article sometimes refers to this as the “basic” or “normal” qualified immunity test.  
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circumstance that may establish immunity even though the officer’s 
conduct violated clearly established law.162 The third is how much weight 
to give lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis, with answers 
ranging from “none” to “presumptive immunity.” 
First, the majority of circuits that have considered the issue have 
recognized lawyers’ advice is at least potentially relevant to qualified 
immunity analysis.163 But at least one circuit—the Second Circuit—has 
suggested that lawyers’ advice is simply irrelevant to the analysis of 
qualified immunity,164 and three dissenting Justices in Messerschmidt 
suggested the same.165 The Second Circuit and the Messerschmidt 
dissenters raise the Harlow presumption that a reasonable officer ordinarily 
knows clearly established law166 to the level of an absolute rule. Under this 
view, since qualified immunity analysis depends purely on whether the 
officer’s conduct violated clearly established law as solidified by the 
decisions of relevant courts, the officer’s receipt of legal advice is 
irrelevant.167 The test of “objective legal reasonableness” means that either 
the conduct violated clearly established law, or it did not.168 
Relatedly, the Ninth Circuit, at least in some cases, has said that 
lawyers’ advice is not relevant to qualified immunity reasonableness 
analysis, but instead is only “evidence of [a] defendant’s good faith.”169 In 
Fourth Amendment cases, this may mean that the court finds lawyers’ 
advice relevant only to the merits question—whether there was a 
 
162 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982). 
163 See, e.g., Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 135 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010); Kelly I, 622 F.3d 
at 255–56; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1231 (9th Cir. 2009); Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. 
App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009); Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006); Miller, 
448 F.3d at 896–97; Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2004); Cox v. 
Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004); Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Swanson v. Powers, 937 F.2d 965, 972 (4th Cir. 1991); Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 
313, 318 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249 (the Supreme Court similarly 
taking into account lawyer’s advice). 
164 In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008).  
165 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
1260 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsburg). 
166 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19. 
167 See County of Erie, 546 F.3d at 229 (“The question of whether a right is ‘clearly established’ is 
determined by reference to the case law extant at the time of the violation. This is an objective, not a 
subjective, test, and reliance upon advice of counsel therefore cannot be used to support the defense of 
qualified immunity.” (citation omitted)). 
168 See id. The Second Circuit’s statement, however, was made in an interlocutory appeal from a 
discovery dispute; the court was not actually analyzing a qualified immunity defense. Id. at 224. 
Moreover, in a case two years later, a different panel suggested that “at the very least the solicitation of 
legal advice informs the reasonableness inquiry.” Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 135 n.3 
(2d Cir. 2010). So, even the Second Circuit has not firmly held that lawyers’ advice is never relevant to 
qualified immunity analysis. 
169 Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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constitutional violation—because good faith is part of that test.170 But the 
court has used the good faith formulation in several lawyers’ advice cases 
outside the Fourth Amendment context.171 It is also possible that the 
opinions are referring to the evidence of “‘objective’ good faith” described 
by Harlow,172 though they do not all say so.173 Some cases do use the same 
“good faith” phrase to suggest that lawyers’ advice is relevant to qualified 
immunity reasonableness analysis,174 while in others, the court has 
considered lawyers’ advice as supporting immunity as part of an overall 
reasonableness analysis without mentioning “good faith.”175 Finally, in one 
recent case, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Messerschmidt may affect the court’s approach.176 
Thus, most circuits hold that lawyers’ advice is relevant to qualified 
immunity analysis. Further, there are a few analytical points on which those 
circuits generally agree. These points form the basis for the threshold 
questions of this Article’s proposed framework for evaluating the relevance 
of lawyers’ advice to qualified immunity.177 One is that lawyers’ advice can 
only support qualified immunity when the officer gives the lawyer all 
relevant information, and neither withholds nor misrepresents relevant 
facts.178 Another is that lawyers’ advice can only support qualified 
immunity when the lawyer actually advises the officer that the officer’s 
contemplated conduct is constitutional.179 Finally, legal advice can only 
 
170 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Van Auken, 887 F.2d 1366, 1369–71 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing and applying 
the “good faith” doctrine). 
171 See, e.g., Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1088, 1094 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners’ due 
process rights); Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 847, 870 (9th Cir. 1999) (employee 
termination); Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1369, 1371 (same). 
172 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.34 (1982); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 
(2012) (noting that qualified immunity examines whether “the officers acted in an objectively 
reasonable manner, or as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith’”).  
173 If these opinions mean subjective good faith, this contradicts the Supreme Court’s insistence 
that qualified immunity analysis does not consider subjective good faith. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (stating that, in qualified immunity analysis, “subjective beliefs about the 
[unconstitutional conduct] are irrelevant”). 
174 See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1231 (9th Cir. 2009).  
175 See, e.g., Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering 
whether reliance was reasonable); Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that “it was not reasonable” for the officer to rely on the lawyers’ advice).  
176 Armstrong v. Asselin, 734 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2013). 
177 See infra Section IV.A.  
178 See, e.g., Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 882–83 (8th Cir. 2000); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 
489, 494 (8th Cir. 1991). 
179 See, e.g., Stearns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2010) (record did not show that 
an attorney actually advised an officer there was probable cause, but that the officer merely assumed 
that was the attorney’s view); Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting reliance on attorney advice when the advice was on the interpretation of state law, not 
whether a firing would violate First Amendment).  
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support immunity when the officer actually follows the advice, which 
means both that the advice must precede the action and that the action may 
not differ from or exceed what the lawyer’s advice endorsed.180 
The second main point of the circuits’ disagreement is over whether to 
consider lawyers’ advice as part of the basic two-step (or in some circuits 
three-step)181 qualified immunity analysis, or instead as an extraordinary 
circumstance that may confer immunity even if the plaintiff can show the 
officer’s conduct did violate clearly established law.182 Many courts 
consider lawyers’ advice as relevant to analyzing whether the officer’s 
conduct was reasonable in the circumstances.183 Though these courts do not 
always expressly say so, they seem to be analyzing lawyers’ advice at step 
two of the analysis, or in those circuits which use a third step, at step 
three.184 These courts thus consider lawyers’ advice as potentially showing 
that a reasonable officer could have relied on the advice and engaged in the 
challenged conduct without knowing that it violated clearly established 
law.185 
Other circuits, in contrast, relegate consideration of lawyers’ advice to 
the category of extraordinary circumstances.186 For these courts, because 
the basic qualified immunity analysis is purely objective, it must turn only 
on a comparison of the officer’s conduct187 to clearly established decisional 
 
180 See, e.g., Charfauros, 249 F.3d at 954 (some actions preceded the advice, and the advice 
indicated that the actions were illegal); Womack v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 193 F.3d 1028, 
1031 (8th Cir. 1999) (the officers did not follow the advice).  
181 See, e.g., Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 2007).  
182 Compare, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (analyzing under 
reasonableness), Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010) (same), Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 
599 F.3d 129, 135 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (same), Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695, 702 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (same), Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (same), and Jennings v. 
Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 1989) (same), with, e.g., Buonocore v. Harris, 
134 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1998) (analyzing under extraordinary circumstances), Silberstein v. City of 
Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006) (same), V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (same), and Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 
830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 1987) (same). 
183 See, e.g., Cox, 391 F.3d at 35 (“In considering the relevance of an officer’s pre-arrest 
consultation with a prosecutor, a reviewing court must determine whether the officer’s reliance on the 
prosecutor’s advice was objectively reasonable.”); see also Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 743 
(8th Cir. 2014) (using reasonableness approach); Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 881 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (same); Kelly I, 622 F.3d at 255–56 (same); Armstrong, 432 F.3d at 702 (same); Forman v. 
Richmond Police Dep’t, 104 F.3d 950, 960 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); E–Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kirksey, 
885 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).  
184 See, e.g., Sueiro Vázquez, 494 F.3d at 234. 
185 See, e.g., Cox, 391 F.3d at 35.  
186 See, e.g., Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006). 
187 At summary judgment, the factual record of the officer’s conduct must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Womack v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 193 F.3d 1028, 
1031 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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law, to which lawyers’ advice is irrelevant.188 These circuits base their 
approach on Harlow’s dicta suggesting that the presumption that a 
reasonable officer knows clearly established law can only be overcome in 
extraordinary circumstances when the officer can show that she neither 
knew nor should have known the clearly established legal standard.189 
Circuits that have analyzed lawyers’ advice under extraordinary 
circumstances are a substantial minority.190 Moreover, adding to the 
complexity, some circuits at times consider lawyers’ advice as relevant 
only to extraordinary circumstances, while at other times consider it under 
basic qualified immunity reasonableness analysis.191 
The circuits also disagree about how much weight to give to lawyers’ 
advice in the qualified immunity analysis. Some circuits suggest that 
lawyers’ advice has no weight in qualified immunity analysis.192 Others 
have stated that while lawyers’ advice might theoretically show 
extraordinary circumstances, as a practical matter the circumstances in 
which it can do so are vanishingly rare.193 Less extreme are courts that 
relegate lawyers’ advice to extraordinary circumstances, but have actually 
developed tests to evaluate extraordinary circumstances and sometimes 
found circumstances they deem sufficiently extraordinary.194 
Towards the middle are courts that consider legal advice among the 
totality of circumstances, but hold that legal advice alone is not enough to 
 
188 In considering “the officer’s conduct,” these courts seem to focus on the actual conduct that 
allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights; the officer’s conduct in seeking legal advice is excluded from 
this part of the analysis.  
189 See 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
190 See supra note 182 (identifying four circuits that apply extraordinary circumstances some or all 
of the time). 
191 Circuits whose approach varies in this way include the Fourth Circuit, compare Buonocore v. 
Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1998) (extraordinary circumstances), with Merchant v. Bauer, 
677 F.3d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasonableness/totality of circumstances), the Sixth Circuit, 
compare, e.g., Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006) (extraordinary 
circumstances), with Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695, 702 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(reasonableness), and the Eighth Circuit, compare, e.g., Putnam v. Keller, 332 F.3d 541, 545 n.3 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (extraordinary circumstances), with Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 743 (8th Cir. 
2014) (reasonableness). The Tenth Circuit seems to consistently apply extraordinary circumstances, 
while the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits seem to consistently evaluate reasonableness. 
192 See, e.g., In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008). 
193 See, e.g., Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 318 (“This circuit has determined that reliance on counsel’s 
legal advice constitutes a qualified immunity defense only under ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ and has 
never found that those circumstances were met.”). But see Armstrong, 432 F.3d at 702 (finding that 
prosecutor’s advice supported qualified immunity defense).  
194 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 740–42 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding qualified 
immunity based on extraordinary circumstances); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); see also Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (applying same test and rejecting extraordinary circumstances argument). 
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establish immunity.195 For these courts, it is desirable both to avoid a 
presumption that a “wave of the prosecutor’s wand” can automatically 
confer immunity, and to not “throw out the baby with the bath water” by 
adopting a rule making it difficult or impossible to rely on lawyers’ advice 
to establish immunity.196 Next are courts that give special weight to legal 
advice, saying it “goes far” to establish immunity (usually in the course of 
holding that the officer is entitled to immunity).197 
Finally, at the most officer-protective end of the spectrum, is the Third 
Circuit, which has held that receipt of lawyers’ advice creates a 
presumption of immunity.198 For the Third Circuit, the desirability of 
incentivizing officers to seek counsel supported giving receipt of lawyers’ 
advice the status of a presumptive qualified immunity defense.199 All the 
courts, even the Third Circuit, seem to agree that legal advice does not per 
se entitle an officer to immunity.200 Also, generally “extraordinary 
circumstances courts” give lawyers’ advice less weight than 
“reasonableness courts,” though the trend is not precise. 
Table 1 outlines this line of cases among the various circuits, 
organized by increasing favorability for officers. However, there remains 
fact- and case-specific variation in how favorable the circuits have been in 
individual cases.  
  
 
195 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2004). 
196 Id. 
197 Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (first use of the “goes far” phrase); see 
also Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2012) (referencing Kijonka’s “goes far” 
language); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1231 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Poulakis v. Rogers, 
341 F. App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009) (same); Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 792 
(8th Cir. 2004) (same). 
198 Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Fiore v. City of Bethlehem, 510 F. App’x 
215, 220 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the Kelly I presumption).  
199 Kelly I, 622 F.3d at 255.  
200 See, e.g., Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1231 (“[C]onsultation with a prosecutor is not conclusive . . . .”); 
Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 235 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A]dvice of counsel alone 
does not per se provide defendants with the shield of immunity.”); Cox, 391 F.3d at 35 (“[A] favorable 
pre-arrest opinion from a friendly prosecutor does not automatically guarantee that qualified immunity 
will follow.”); Forman v. Richmond Police Dep’t, 104 F.3d 950, 960 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A]dvice . . . 
does not alone satisfy [the officer]’s burden of acting reasonably . . . .”).  
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TABLE 1: 
Effect on Qualified Immunity Analysis Circuits201 
Suggests lawyers’ advice is irrelevant to qualified 
immunity analysis 
Second Circuit202 
Extraordinary circumstances test and/or reasonableness 




Extraordinary circumstances test only Tenth Circuit206 
Reasonableness test only 
First Circuit207 
Seventh Circuit208 
Presumption of immunity Third Circuit209 
Independent of the analytical step at which courts consider legal 
advice or the rhetorical weight they attach to it, courts also vary as to 
whether they apply a specific test for evaluating its effect on qualified 
immunity. Some have no specific test, and simply mention advice as “part 
of the mix”210 of reasonableness, which either supports the court’s 
 
201 Ninth Circuit jurisprudence does not fall into a single category, and was thus excluded from 
Table 1. For a discussion of the varying decisions the Ninth Circuit has made, see supra notes 169–76 
and accompanying text. 
202 In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008); see also supra note 168. 
203 Compare Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1998) (extraordinary circumstances), 
with Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasonableness/totality of circumstances). 
204 Compare Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006) (extraordinary 
circumstances), with Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695, 702 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(reasonableness). 
205 Compare Putnam v. Keller, 332 F.3d 541, 545 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (extraordinary 
circumstances), with Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 743 (8th Cir. 2014) (reasonableness). 
206 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 740–42 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding qualified 
immunity based on extraordinary circumstances); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); see also Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (applying same test and rejecting extraordinary circumstances argument). 
207 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2004). 
208 Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2012); Forman v. Richmond Police 
Dep’t, 104 F.3d 950, 960 (7th Cir. 1997).  
209 Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Fiore v. City of Bethlehem, 510 F. App’x 
215, 220 (3d Cir. 2013).  
210 Poulakis, 341 F. App’x 523, 534 (11th Cir. 2009).  
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conclusion that the officer is immune or does not disturb the court’s 
conclusion that the officer’s conduct was unreasonable.211 
Other courts have specific frameworks for evaluating whether 
lawyers’ advice supports an officer’s qualified immunity defense. The 
Tenth Circuit, for example, has adopted this multistep test for determining 
when lawyers’ advice establishes extraordinary circumstances: “(1) how 
unequivocal and specific the advice was; (2) how complete the information 
provided to the attorney giving the advice was; (3) the prominence and 
competence of the attorney; and (4) the time between the dispersal of the 
advice and the action taken.”212 The Ninth Circuit, while not applying 
extraordinary circumstances, also has sometimes used a multifactor test: (1) 
whether the attorney was independent, (2) whether the advice addressed the 
constitutionality of the proposed action, (3) whether the attorney had all the 
relevant facts, and (4) whether the advice was sought before or after the 
officer’s action.213 Other courts have identified similarly specific factors, 
without attempting to prescribe a comprehensive test.214 This Article’s 
proposed five-factor test for evaluating reasonableness draws on the factors 
used by the circuits. 
C. Messerschmidt v. Millender: The Supreme Court Considers 
Lawyers’ Advice and Qualified Immunity 
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved these questions that 
divide the circuits. But recently, in Messerschmidt v. Millender, the Court 
did raise the issue, suggesting strongly that lawyers’ advice is relevant to 
qualified immunity analysis, conveying that the Justices are interested in 
the question of how to weigh lawyers’ advice.215 
Messerschmidt was a Fourth Amendment case involving a warrant 
search of the house of a suspected gang member.216 Before submitting the 
 
211 See, e.g., Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 2012); Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 
300, 309 (6th Cir. 2011); Kelly I, 622 F.3d at 255; Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 
896 (6th Cir. 2006); Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004).  
212 Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Davis v. 
Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (referencing the Tenth Circuit test); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., 
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990) (developing the test applied in Roska). 
213 Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Dixon v. Wallowa County, 
336 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the Johnston factors).  
214 See, e.g., Moss v. Martin, 614 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he weight that we place on 
[defendant]’s reliance on advice of counsel depends on factors like how much information counsel had 
and how closely tailored the advice was to the position in question.”); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 
(1st Cir. 2004) (mentioning as relevant the depth of the discussion between officer and prosecutor and 
whether the officer provided the lawyer with all the relevant facts).   
215 See 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012). 
216 Id. at 1240–41.  
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warrant to a judge, the officer had sought and gotten the approval of his 
superior and a deputy district attorney.217 The Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusion that the searching officer was not entitled to qualified 
immunity, concluding the officer’s judgment that the warrant was 
supported by probable cause “may have been mistaken, but it was not 
‘plainly incompetent.’”218 The Court primarily held that the officer’s 
probable cause determination was reasonable in light of the facts before the 
officer and the evidence he intended to search for.219 But the Court then 
continued on to say that the approval of the warrant by a deputy district 
attorney further supported the reasonableness of the officer’s belief.220 
Seeking these approvals, the Court reasoned, showed the officer had taken 
“every step that could reasonably be expected” of him and thus supported 
the reasonableness of this belief that there was probable cause.221 
The Court then explained how attorney review is relevant. The Court 
first distinguished Malley v. Briggs,222 which rejected immunity even 
though the warrant had been approved by a magistrate.223 Malley means that 
review by superiors or by an attorney “cannot be regarded as dispositive” 
because they are “part of the prosecution team.”224 But, Malley did not 
suggest that “review by others is irrelevant to the objective reasonableness 
of the officers’ determination.”225 To the contrary, the Court concluded, 
“[t]he fact that the officers secured these approvals is certainly pertinent.”226 
The majority’s statements about the effect of counsel’s approval are 
arguably dicta, since the opinion had already concluded that immunity 
should apply.227 Further, the issue in Messerschmidt was complicated by the 
fact that the case involved counsel’s advice, approval by a superior, and 
endorsement by a magistrate—and the Court did not analyze these 
separately.228 However, at least five Justices endorsed the view that 
counsel’s advice is “pertinent.”229 Further, the Court made no suggestion 
 
217 Id. at 1243. The deputy district attorney reviewed the materials and approved the warrant for 
probable cause by initialing it. Id.  
218 Id. at 1249 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  
219 Id.  
220 Id.  
221 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989 (1984)). 
222 Id. at 1249–50.  
223 Malley, 475 U.S. at 345. 
224 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249.  
225 Id. at 1250.  
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 1249.  
228 See id.  
229 Id. at 1250.  
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that the advice should be considered under the heading of extraordinary 
circumstances; instead the Court clearly incorporated the lawyer’s review 
into its overall analysis of whether the officer’s conduct was reasonable in 
the circumstances.230 Beyond this, the Court’s opinion left open most of the 
questions on which the circuits are divided.231 Nor did the Court note the 
circuit split over how to consider lawyers’ advice, or consider that the 
lawyers’ advice issue arises in contexts other than Fourth Amendment 
cases. However, the oral argument in the case did suggest that at least some 
of the Justices were interested in considering how much weight lawyers’ 
advice should have.232 
D. Commentators’ Views 
Scholars writing on qualified immunity have noted that the circuits are 
split over how to consider the receipt of legal advice as part of the analysis, 
and have cataloged the cases that raise this issue.233 These taxonomic efforts 
have not been accompanied, however, by proposals for comprehensive 
solutions. Further, they tend to assume that the issue must be addressed 
under the heading of extraordinary circumstances,234 even though many 
circuits have analyzed the issue (and the Supreme Court has suggested the 
issue should be analyzed) under basic qualified immunity reasonableness 
analysis. Other articles have considered related issues, like the following-
orders scenario, but have not focused on the proper test for evaluating how 
 
230 See id.  
231 See supra Section II.B.  
232 At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts (who wrote the majority opinion) asked petitioner’s 
counsel whether the Court had previously addressed the attorneys’ advice issue, which suggested that 
he recognized the question was a new one for the Court. See Messerschmidt Transcript, supra note †, at 
4. Further, the Chief Justice’s colloquy with counsel about relevance of attorney advice and officer’s 
incentives to seek advice indicates that he is interested in these questions. See id. at 41–43. Justice 
Scalia, though he joined the majority opinion in its entirety, at oral argument suggested that the advice 
of superiors and attorneys could only be relevant to subjective good faith, which is not a part of the 
qualified immunity test. See id. at 16. Justice Sotomayor, combining the receipt of legal advice with 
approval by superiors, dismissed the argument as a “Nuremburg defense” irrelevant to the qualified 
immunity analysis. Id. at 5. The oral argument suggests that the Court may be aware of and interested in 
the question, and might grant certiorari in a case that squarely presents the question and the opportunity 
to resolve the circuit split. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a); supra Section II.B (examining the circuit split). After 
Messerschmidt, then, the main questions about lawyers’ advice remain open, but there is reason to think 
the Court might be interested in answering them.  
233 See supra note 14.  
234 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 14, at § 3:9 n.8, at 331 (analyzing cases under the extraordinary 
circumstances exception); Schwartz, supra note 14, at § 9A.05[C] (same); Karen M. Blum, Qualified 
Immunity: Discretionary Function, Extraordinary Circumstances, and Other Nuances, 23 TOURO L. 
REV. 57, 65–68 (2007) (same).  
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lawyers’ advice fits into qualified immunity analysis.235 Several student 
pieces have also noted the issue in the context of critiquing a specific 
case236 or examining broader issues.237 
This Article analyzes in detail the variety of the circuits’ approaches, 
considers lawyers’ advice as a standalone question, and proposes a specific, 
comprehensive framework for how to treat lawyers’ advice. In doing so, it 
examines the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Messerschmidt and considers the entire spectrum of circuit court 
approaches. The Article next explains why the right answer is to analyze 
lawyers’ advice as part of basic reasonableness analysis rather than under 
the extraordinary circumstances exception, and proposes a specific 
framework of threshold questions and balancing factors for determining 
when reliance is reasonable. 
III. WHY LAWYERS’ ADVICE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY ANALYSIS 
This Part explains why and how courts should consider lawyers’ 
advice as relevant to the qualified immunity defense. A court considering 
lawyers’ advice as part of the qualified immunity defense at the summary 
judgment stage238 should consider it under the basic qualified immunity 
test, as relevant to the question of whether a reasonable officer in the 
circumstances would have known that his intended conduct would violate 
clearly established law.239 It should not be considered under the heading of 
 
235 See, e.g., Daniel L. Pines, Are Even Torturers Immune from Suit? How Attorney General 
Opinions Shield Government Employees from Civil Litigation and Criminal Prosecution, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 93, 123–26 (2008) (discussing circuit decisions on lawyers’ advice in the context of 
arguing that federal Attorney General Opinions should immunize federal officers from civil and 
criminal liability for torture); Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship 
Between § 1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 153, 
186 (2011) (examining the superior orders scenario). 
236 See, e.g., Recent Case, Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010), 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 2083 (2011) (criticizing the Third Circuit’s decision to adopt a presumption of immunity in favor 
of officers who seek lawyers’ advice). 
237 See, e.g., Hobel, supra note 153, at 605 (considering advice of counsel in context of “torture 
memos” and the superior orders defense); Adam L. Littman, Note, A Second Line of Defense for Public 
Officials Asserting Qualified Immunity: What “Extraordinary Circumstances” Prevent Officials from 
Knowing the Law Governing Their Conduct?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 645, 647 (2008) (considering the 
extraordinary circumstances defense and arguing for presumption of immunity for reliance on a statute, 
regulation, or ordinance). 
238 The Article focuses on summary judgment because that is when qualified immunity is usually 
resolved, and also when the Supreme Court has suggested it should be resolved whenever possible. See 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001). 
239 See Suboh v. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing the inquiry as 
“whether a reasonable officer, similarly situated, would understand that the challenged conduct violated 
th[e] established right”).  
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extraordinary circumstances, which is outmoded both because it has never 
been invoked by the Supreme Court and because it is out of step with the 
Court’s modern approach to qualified immunity.240 Consistent with that 
approach, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether, under the 
circumstances, a reasonable officer would have relied on the lawyer’s 
advice to conclude that the contemplated conduct would not violate clearly 
established law.241 The court should approach the question neither with an 
extraordinary circumstances presumption against immunity,242 nor a 
presumption in favor of immunity,243 but instead should focus on a 
reasonableness analysis tailored to the facts of the specific case.244 
Under this approach, a court should examine whether the officer 
reasonably relied on the lawyer’s advice in engaging in the challenged 
action; if the reliance was reasonable, then the officer should be immune. 
In Part IV, the Article proposes a specific test for evaluating 
reasonableness—courts should consider three threshold questions to 
determine whether legal advice may be relied upon, then balance five 
factors to decide whether a reasonable officer would have relied on the 
advice. 
A. Lawyers’ Advice Should Support Qualified Immunity 
Lawyers’ advice to officers should be considered in qualified 
immunity analysis because doing so is consistent with qualified immunity 
doctrine, furthers the policies behind the doctrine, and is broadly consistent 
with common law. 
1. Doctrinal Consistency.—First, allowing lawyers’ advice to 
support the qualified immunity defense fits with the Supreme Court’s 
development of qualified immunity doctrine. The overall goal of the 
qualified immunity defense is to make sure that an officer is only held 
liable when the officer has “fair notice” that the officer’s conduct is 
illegal.245 The current doctrine accomplishes this goal by evaluating 
whether the officer’s conduct violated clearly established law of which a 
reasonable officer would have known.246 As the Court has emphasized, the 
defense is robust and protects all but the “plainly incompetent or those who 
 
240 See infra Section III.B.1.  
241 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004).  
242 See, e.g., Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006). 
243 See, e.g., Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010).  
244 See, e.g., Cox, 391 F.3d at 35.  
245 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam). 
246 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982). 
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knowingly violate the law”247 by giving officers “breathing room to make 
reasonable but mistaken judgments.”248 
In developing the doctrine, the Supreme Court has focused on 
examining whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances would 
have known that their contemplated conduct would violate clearly 
established law.249 This attentiveness to circumstance requires allowing 
lawyers’ advice to support immunity, in at least some cases, because the 
fact that a lawyer advised the officer that the conduct would be legal is a 
relevant circumstance which shows that a reasonable officer would not 
have known the conduct would violate clearly established law.250 A 
reasonable officer who is not a legal expert, and is confronted with a 
difficult (to the officer) legal question about how to act, may reasonably be 
influenced by a lawyer’s advice that his intended course of action is 
legal.251 Thus, both the reasonableness courts and extraordinary 
circumstances courts agree that, at least in some cases, lawyers’ advice can 
be a circumstance demonstrating that a reasonable officer would not have 
known they were about to violate the law.252 
It is true that since Harlow, the qualified immunity test has generally 
presumed that a reasonable officer should know clearly established law, so 
that an officer may be liable whether or not the officer subjectively knew 
the legal rules.253 But this presumption is based on a fiction—that officers 
are aware of ongoing developments in constitutional law.254 The fiction 
serves important purposes—to give officers and local governments 
independent incentives to become aware of and abide by developments in 
substantive law, to remedy violations when the law is clear, and to punish 
 
247 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
248 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074, 2085 (2011)). 
249 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in 
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer 
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
645 (1987) (noting the importance in qualified immunity analysis of considering the particular factual 
circumstances of the case).  
250 See, e.g., Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 896 (6th Cir. 2006). 
251 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that considering legal advice in 
“the totality of the circumstances is consistent with an inquiry into the objective legal reasonableness of 
an officer’s belief”). 
252 See, e.g., id.; V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 
1990). Where the courts disagree is whether such occasions are exceptional.  
253 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
254 See, e.g., Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 535 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting this fiction); see also 
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle (Kelly III), 544 F. App’x 129, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[Q]ualified 
immunity may be granted when there is a breakdown in the legal fiction that reasonably competent 
police officers know every clearly established law.” (citing Amore, 624 F.3d at 535)).  
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officers who act in willful or negligent ignorance about the state of the 
law.255 When an officer seeks a lawyer’s advice before acting, however, 
adhering to this fiction will sometimes not be sensible.256 Since the “clearly 
established” rule is designed to give officers incentives to learn and abide 
by clear substantive law by punishing them if they fail to do so,257 it does 
not make sense to hold an officer liable when he acts on that incentive by 
seeking legal advice, is told that the contemplated conduct is legal, and 
then reasonably relies on that legal advice.258 
Moreover, the idea that after Harlow, law is simply clearly established 
or not—so that seeking a lawyer’s advice can make no difference—ignores 
how the circuits and the Supreme Court actually perform qualified 
immunity analyses once an officer is sued. Qualified immunity analysis 
often proceeds through a close examination and comparison of a web of 
precedents with the case at issue, to see whether the precedents’ holdings 
are sufficiently similar to “clearly establish” a violation.259 To suppose that 
a reasonable officer in the line of duty can or does undertake a similar 
analysis before acting is, again, a fiction.260 It is a valuable fiction, but it 
pushes the fiction too far to presume that a reasonable officer can gain 
nothing by consulting a lawyer—who should know the applicable law and 
be competent to actually perform the relevant analysis.261 
Considering lawyers’ advice as supporting qualified immunity is also 
consistent with the Court’s varied formulations of the qualified immunity 
test. If the question is whether an officer had “fair notice” that he would be 
violating the law,262 at least sometimes an officer would lack fair notice 
when he recognized he was unsure about what the law required, asked a 
designated legal expert for an opinion, was told that his contemplated 
 
255 See Kelly III, 544 F. App’x at 136–37. 
256 See, e.g., id.  
257 See Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the 
Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 121 (1991) (“This objective standard will not 
overdeter public officials, but will instead give them an incentive to ‘pause to consider whether a 
proposed course of action can be squared with the Constitution’ . . . .” (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985))); Ravenell, supra note 235, at 199 (“Denying government officials qualified 
immunity when the applicable legal rule is unambiguous gives officials an incentive to know the law.”). 
258 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (“The principles of qualified immunity 
shield an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct 
complies with the law.”). 
259 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381–83 (2014) (performing such an analysis); Nord 
v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 738–42 (8th Cir. 2014) (same). 
260 See Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 535 (2d Cir. 2010). 
261 See Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (contrasting the relative 
competency of the prosecutor and police officer to understand clearly established law). 
262 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam).  
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conduct would be legal, and reasonably believed the lawyer’s advice.263 
Similarly, an officer who reasonably relies on legal advice that causes a 
constitutional violation acts within the “breathing room to make reasonable 
but mistaken judgments.”264 Finally, if the question is whether the officer 
was “plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate[d] the law,”265 at least 
sometimes a competent officer may seek legal advice on a question about 
which the officer is uncertain, but receive the wrong advice.266 In that 
circumstance, the officer is not willfully violating the law—instead, the 
officer is attempting to avoid violating the law. Nor is the officer 
incompetent—instead, the violation occurs because the officer was 
misinformed by someone the officer reasonably believed was better 
situated to know the relevant law.267 
Indeed, consulting a lawyer is often the main or only way that a 
reasonable and competent officer who is unsure what the law requires can 
try to find an answer.268 The constitutional law applicable in many areas of 
§ 1983 litigation is complex, circumstance-specific, and evolves 
regularly.269 Officers usually do not have the time or expertise to learn all of 
this law.270 Certainly officers do have the duty and ability to know the 
broad legal standards that govern their conduct.271 But if an officer knows 
(or fears) the law is complicated, confronts a difficult problem, wishes to 
avoid a mistake, and so seeks legal advice, that often will be the officer’s 
best and most reasonable course of action.272 This is especially true when 
the officer has good reasons for wanting to take some action rather than 
 
263 See, e.g., V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990). 
264 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074, 2085 (2011)). 
265 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
266 See, e.g., Kijonka, 363 F.3d at 648. 
267 See, e.g., id.  
268 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 
25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004). 
269 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 214 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Law 
in the area is constantly evolving and, correspondingly, variously interpreted.”). 
270 Cf. Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 535 (2d Cir. 2010). For example, there is little reason to 
think a sheriff in a small North Dakota county would know the intricacies of the Pickering balancing 
test, but it would be reasonable to rely on the county’s chief legal officer—the county attorney—to 
know it, or be able to learn it. See Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(involving a county sheriff in a small department who asked the county attorney for advice before 
terminating a deputy sheriff); see also, e.g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving 
a lawyer who was asked for advice by an officer and had an intern prepare a research memo on the 
question). 
271 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982). This is also a reason for making the 
complexity of the legal question one of the balancing factors in deciding whether the officer’s reliance 
on the lawyer’s advice was reasonable. See infra Section IV.B.  
272 See, e.g., L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1990).  
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simply doing nothing.273 Seeking advice if the officer is uncertain is what a 
competent officer should do—and qualified immunity doctrine should 
encourage the officer to do so.274. 
2. Sound Policy.—Incorporating lawyers’ advice into qualified 
immunity analysis is also consistent with the balance of policy 
considerations driving the doctrine. The overall purpose of § 1983 is to 
remedy and deter abuses of power that violate constitutional rights.275 
Within that framework, qualified immunity doctrine balances “the need to 
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly 
[against] the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”276 Considering 
lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis serves all of these goals. 
If lawyers’ advice may support the qualified immunity defense, this 
will incentivize officers to seek advice before acting in uncertain 
situations.277 Police officials are actually aware of the cases allowing 
reliance on lawyers’ advice to support the immunity defense, and have 
advised officers to seek advice to take advantage of this rule.278 If officers 
more frequently seek advice, this should actually reduce the instances of 
abusive violations of rights because generally officers may be more likely 
than lawyers to make legal mistakes.279 Moreover, a rule that encourages 
advice-seeking may actually aid plaintiffs’ ability to recover in cases when 
 
273 See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012) (“We have called the government interest in 
avoiding ‘unwarranted timidity’ on the part of those engaged in the public’s business ‘the most 
important special government immunity-producing concern.’” (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 
521 U.S. 399, 408 (1997))); Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408 (noting that qualified immunity doctrine 
“protect[s] the public from unwarranted timidity on the part of public officials”). 
274 See Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010); Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th 
Cir. 2004).  
275 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) (“[T]he deterrence of future 
abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983.” (citing 
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980))). 
276 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  
277 See Kelly I, 622 F.3d at 255–56; Messerschmidt Transcript, supra note †, at 43 (“Do you 
want—do you want to encourage officers, when they’re applying for search warrants, to have them 
reviewed by the deputy district attorney or not?” (question from Roberts, C.J.)). 
278 See, e.g., Elliot B. Spector, A Little Advice May Buy You Immunity, POLICE CHIEF, May 2005, at 
10 (article in magazine directed at police chiefs advising officers that consulting a lawyer may support a 
qualified immunity defense). 
279 See Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen an officer is unsure of 
how to proceed, his ability to seek guidance from a prosecutor may protect an individual from wrongful 
arrest.”); Kijonka, 363 F.3d at 648 (noting that having officers consult prosecutors is “a valuable screen 
against false arrest”).  
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an officer seeks legal advice and then disregards it.280 Thus, considering 
lawyers’ advice should actually reduce abusive violations of rights, and 
may sometimes make it easier to punish such violations. 
Further, a contrary rule would “create perverse incentives” for officers 
to not seek advice because “if they sought advice of counsel that turned out 
to be wrong, they would be liable, but if they maintained a deliberate 
ignorance, they might be able to get away with arguing that no reasonable 
officer would have known that the rule applied to their particular 
situation.”281 This disincentive to seek legal advice, in turn, increases 
officers’ tendency to “exercise power irresponsibly.”282 
Considering lawyers’ advice also, perhaps more obviously, serves the 
policy of shielding officials who perform their duties reasonably.283 As 
noted, when an officer confronted with a difficult legal question seeks an 
answer from a lawyer, that officer is acting reasonably and desirably. It is 
therefore good policy for the qualified immunity doctrine to protect that 
officer when her reliance on the lawyer’s opinion was reasonable. It would 
be unfair to punish officers who reasonably recognize they may not know 
the law and seek legal advice before acting, but then are misled by the 
lawyer’s advice.284 
3. Common Law Support.—Finally, incorporating lawyers’ advice 
into the qualified immunity defense is also broadly consistent with 
common law. The Court has looked to common law for guidance in 
interpreting § 1983, and in particular, in crafting immunities under the 
statute.285 In developing the doctrine of qualified immunity, the Court drew 
on the common law rule that good faith and probable cause were a defense 
to an action for false arrest, and then expanded that defense to apply to all 
§ 1983 causes of action.286 In modeling qualified immunity, the Court has 
looked both to common law in 1871 and to more modern developments,287 
and has followed common law rules flexibly, not “slavishly,” to serve the 
 
280 See, e.g., Borges Colón v. Román-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006) (jury concluding 
that lawyers had actually suggested acts were not legal); Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 
954 (9th Cir. 2001) (court concluding the same).  
281 Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1998). 
282 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  
283 See id.  
284 See, e.g., L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 888 (9th Cir. 1990) (arguing 
that it would be “counterproductive and even oppressive” to impose liability on officers faced with a 
“complex and uncertain” legal issue who sought and followed legal advice).  
285 E.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1662–65 (2012); see also supra notes 51–52 and 
accompanying text.  
286 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
287 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1662, 1665.  
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particular purposes of immunity under § 1983.288 Scholars debate whether 
the Court’s use of common law is consistent or productive,289 but it is at 
least true that the Court considers common law analogs relevant to 
developing immunity rules under § 1983. 
At common law, advice of counsel was “a good defense” to causes of 
action “where intent is requisite to the offense and such intent involves a 
conclusion as to a matter of law.”290 This description aligns fairly closely 
with the issue in a qualified immunity case—whether an officer should 
have known his conduct would violate clearly established law. More 
specifically, at common law in 1871, advice of counsel was a defense to a 
suit for malicious prosecution,291 another cause of action that the Court has 
sometimes considered as a common law analog to the § 1983 suit.292 This is 
still the modern rule.293 The modern rule also considers advice of counsel 
relevant in other contexts to “the client’s state of mind,”294 which supports 
considering advice of counsel relevant to an officer’s argument that his 
conduct was reasonable and in objective good faith. It is true that under the 
common law approach, advice of counsel is relevant to subjective state of 
mind.295 But transmuting this into an objective intent inquiry is fully 
consistent with the Court’s approach in qualified immunity cases. This is 
exactly what Harlow did when it transformed the subjective common law 
good faith defense into the “‘objective’ good faith” defense of qualified 
immunity.296 
4. Responses to Counterarguments.—For these reasons, almost all 
the circuits, as well as the Messerschmidt majority, recognize that lawyers’ 
advice should carry some weight in qualified immunity analysis.297 While 
 
288 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644–45 (1987). 
289 See supra notes 70–71.  
290 Thomas L. Preston, Advice of Counsel as a Defense, 28 VA. L. REV. 26, 49 (1941) 
(summarizing advice of counsel defense across several different areas of law, and collecting cases 
before and after 1871).  
291 Id. at 35. 
292 E.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483–84 (1994) (analogizing between malicious 
prosecution claims and claims that call into question the lawfulness of confinement).  
293 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 666 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
294 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29 cmt. c. 
295 Id. 
296 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) 
(“Harlow . . . completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the 
common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with 
an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action.”). 
297 See supra Sections II.B–C.  
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there are some arguments that this view is misguided,298 the benefits of this 
test outweigh any costs. 
a. Barred by precedent.—One objection is that allowing reliance 
on lawyers’ advice to support an officer’s qualified immunity defense is 
inconsistent with the Court’s own precedent. In Malley v. Briggs, the Court 
held that an officer’s independent duty to act reasonably in light of clearly 
established law means that an officer is not per se immune simply because 
a judge approves a warrant for probable cause.299 Further, reliance on 
lawyers’ advice is an even weaker case for per se immunity than Malley 
since a lawyer, unlike a magistrate, usually will have some incentive to 
approve the officer’s proposed course of action.300 But, while the Court in 
Malley rejected a per se rule of immunity, it did not adopt a countervailing 
per se rule that external opinions about the legality of the conduct are 
irrelevant to the analysis. The Court in Messerschmidt so held when it 
rejected the argument that Malley creates a per se rule, and suggested that 
both approval of the warrant and the advice of the lawyer did support the 
officer’s qualified immunity defense.301 
It might also be argued that considering lawyers’ advice is 
inconsistent with Harlow, which made qualified immunity an objective test 
that considers only the officer’s conduct in light of clearly established law, 
and established a presumption that a reasonable officer generally knows 
that clearly established law.302 But the Court has never held that the Harlow 
presumption is an absolute rule. To the contrary, in Harlow itself the Court 
made clear that the presumption was only that, and that there could be 
extraordinary circumstances in which it should not hold.303 This Article 
proposes doing away with the extraordinary circumstances label, but 
clearly Harlow recognized that an officer should not always be presumed to 
know clearly established law. Therefore Harlow does not bar considering 
lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis, and indeed actually seems 
to allow it. Finally, even if either of these precedents were inconsistent with 
 
298 E.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1260 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that considering prosecutors’ advice as relevant “would turn the Fourth Amendment on its 
head”).  
299 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (similarly 
rejecting the qualified immunity defense because any reasonable officer would have known that the 
warrant was invalid). 
300 See Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249. 
301 Id. at 1249–50 (stating that Malley did not hold that “review by others is irrelevant to the 
objective reasonableness of the officers’ determination”). 
302 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (“Harlow . . . 
rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard.”). 
303 457 U.S. at 819. 
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the proposed rule, the Court has proven more willing to reverse itself in 
qualified immunity cases than in most other statutory interpretation 
contexts, which suggests it might be more willing to revisit its precedents 
on this issue.304 
b. No need for even greater margin of error.—Another, related 
concern is that considering lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis 
would wrongly expand the margin of error in a test that is already very 
officer friendly. The clearly established law test already accommodates 
uncertainties in the law and gives officers room for reasonable error. It does 
not require officers to know all legal developments, only ones clearly 
established by Supreme Court decisions, and those of the officer’s home 
circuit.305 This is more than enough margin of error to protect officers from 
liability, and indeed it is often argued that the doctrine is already too officer 
friendly.306 But this argument disregards that an officer who is not a lawyer 
is unlikely to be familiar even with “clearly established” law as it develops 
in every area of law the officer may encounter.307 When the officer actually 
is unsure about the law, at least sometimes it is reasonable for the officer to 
rely on a lawyer’s advice to determine what that “clearly established” law 
requires, even though sometimes the lawyer will err.308 
More importantly, considering lawyers’ advice in the analysis does 
not simply give officers an even wider margin of error for officers to 
violate rights. Instead, it protects officers when they act reasonably in an 
attempt to avoid violating rights, and moreover, gives them an incentive to 
seek advice that, in most cases, will tend to reduce their error rate.309 Since 
qualified immunity already makes it very difficult for plaintiffs to prevail 
even when their rights are violated, the marginal increase in officer 
protection conferred by considering lawyers’ advice in the qualified 
immunity analysis is justified by the prospective decrease in overall 
violations that should follow from a rule that encourages officers to seek 
advice before acting.310 
 
304 See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
305 See, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam). 
306 See, e.g., Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 78.  
307 See, e.g., Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 535 (2d Cir. 2010). 
308 See, e.g., Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prosecutor 
disregarded clearly established law, but the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity for 
reasonably relying on the prosecutor’s advice).  
309 See Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1998).  
310 See Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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c. Transformation into a subjective inquiry.—Still others might 
claim that considering lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis 
would import a subjective inquiry that is inconsistent with the Court’s 
emphasis on objective reasonableness.311 If the officer is allowed to support 
his defense by arguing that the lawyer’s advice would have led a 
reasonable officer to believe that he would not be violating the law, this is 
really an argument that the officer did not subjectively know the law. But 
this contradicts the Court’s modern approach to qualified immunity since 
Anderson v. Creighton, which is to examine the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions in the circumstances of the particular case.312 The Court 
emphasized in Anderson that this attention to circumstances does not 
transmute the inquiry into a subjective inquiry.313 Circuit courts applying 
the reasonableness approach to lawyers’ advice have been able to weigh 
lawyers’ advice in the analysis without changing the analysis into a 
subjective one.314 They can consider the lawyer’s advice as it would have 
influenced the conduct of a reasonable officer in the circumstances, rather 
than asking whether this particular officer–defendant subjectively relied on 
the advice. Certainly the subjective/objective distinction in qualified 
immunity doctrine is subtle and sometimes confusing,315 but extending the 
“reasonableness in the circumstances” rule to include the legal advice 
circumstance does not alter or overcomplicate the objective reasonableness 
approach.316 
d. Practical concerns: incentives for collusion and empty-
handed plaintiffs.—A final set of objections is that allowing 
lawyers’ advice to support officers’ qualified immunity will create 
undesirable incentives for misconduct and collusion, and leave plaintiffs 
 
311 See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 
(1982). 
312 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be 
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .”).  
313 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (noting that considering the factual circumstances of the case “does 
not reintroduce . . . the inquiry into officials’ subjective intent that Harlow sought to minimize”). 
314 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004).  
315 Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity: 
Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective Intent 
That Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 888 (1998) (noting confusion 
about interaction between subjective and objective standards after Harlow).  
316 See Amore v. Navarro, 624 F.3d 522, 535 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that qualified immunity 
analysis does not “consider an official’s subjective intent,” but does “consider ‘the particular facts of 
the case,’ including the objective information before the officer at the time of the arrest” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987))). 
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empty-handed in cases where an officer engaged in conduct that violated 
the law.317 
First, considering lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis 
might give officers and attorneys negative incentives to collude to cross-
immunize.318 If officers know that “a little advice may buy you 
immunity,”319 then they might simply have lawyers’ rubber-stamp their 
proposed actions. As the Messerschmidt majority noted, since the lawyer 
and the officer often will be on the same “team,”320 the lawyer may have 
natural incentives to unduly sanction the officer’s intended course of 
action.321 And if the rule were that advice presumptively provides 
immunity, officers could give the lawyer only barebones facts, which 
would then give the lawyer herself plausible deniability against liability. 
This would confer immunity on officers and lawyers who do not deserve it, 
and allow governments to push the envelope of conduct in ever more 
abusive ways.322 
Despite this concern, it does not support an absolute rule against 
considering lawyers’ advice in qualified immunity analysis. Instead, it 
supports a searching examination of the circumstances to decide whether 
the officer’s reliance on the lawyer’s advice was actually reasonable.323 
Under this Article’s framework—outlined in Part IV—lawyers’ advice will 
not support immunity under the proposed test if an officer leaves out 
important facts, or if the lawyer’s “advice” is an unspecific “sure, sounds 
good.”324 There are also other constraints that will operate to inhibit lawyers 
from merely rubber-stamping officers’ requests. One is that the lawyer 
 
317 In Messerschmidt, Justice Sotomayor pithily invoked these criticisms by describing the 
majority’s approach as “four wrongs apparently make a right.” 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1260 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
318 See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 847, 870 (9th Cir. 1999) (arguing, in a 
case of the firing of a firefighter, ruling “that reliance on the advice of counsel is sufficient to confer 
qualified immunity” would “provid[e] an incentive for lawyers to tell public-employer clients that they 
have immunity even when other factors suggest the absence of immunity”). 
319 Spector, supra note 278, at 10. 
320 132 S. Ct. at 1249. 
321 See id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To make their views 
relevant is to enable those teammates (whether acting in good or bad faith) to confer immunity on each 
other for unreasonable conduct . . . .”); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“[P]rosecutors work hand in glove with . . . officers . . . .”).  
322 See Jeffries, supra note 125, at 120 (“[T]he repeated invocation of qualified immunity will 
reduce the meaning of the Constitution to the lowest plausible conception of its content.”); Pfander, 
supra note 125, at 1617 (“[B]y authorizing courts to dodge the merits, the Pearson regime may . . . 
produce a kind of race to the bottom in which courts validate constitutionally dubious official action.”). 
323 See Cox, 391 F.3d at 35 (“Although we acknowledge the possibility of collusion between police 
and prosecutors, we do not believe that possibility warrants a general rule foreclosing reliance on a 
prosecutor’s advice.”). 
324 See infra Section IV.A.  
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herself is potentially liable for endorsing actions that violate clearly 
established law.325 Another is the independent ethical rules that govern 
government lawyers’ conduct—for example, the rule that the lawyer’s 
client is the government itself, not the official, which means that the lawyer 
has an ethical duty to prevent officers exposing the municipality to liability, 
not simply to aid the individual officer in any way possible.326 
A related concern is that immunizing officers based on lawyers’ 
advice will leave empty-handed plaintiffs whose rights have actually been 
violated. To some extent, this is simply inherent in the qualified immunity 
doctrine. The defense protects officers for “reasonable but mistaken 
judgments,”327 which means that its core purpose is to sometimes prevent 
liability even though the plaintiff’s rights were been violated. Also, even 
when lawyers’ advice supports immunity for the officer who took the 
advice, the plaintiff will not always be without remedy. The plaintiff may 
be able to pursue the lawyer as a defendant,328 and the standard of 
reasonableness is higher for a lawyer who is expected to know and be able 
to research the law.329 If the lawyer gave incompetent legal advice on which 
the officer reasonably relied before committing the violation, the lawyer 
should be liable.330 Further, the lawyer generally will not be able to claim 
absolute immunity. Even in Fourth Amendment cases, a prosecutor will 
generally not have absolute immunity for advising officers that probable 
cause exists to search, seize, or arrest.331 And outside the Fourth 
Amendment context, cases in which the lawyer would be entitled to invoke 
absolute immunity for giving advice are rare.332 
This benefit would be magnified when plaintiffs are eligible to sue the 
government itself. For example, if a county had a policy or custom under 
which its attorneys always gave officers legal “cover” for their actions, 
 
325 See, e.g., Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004).  
326 Brett Kandt, Held to a Higher Standard: Ethical Considerations for Public Lawyers, NEV. 
LAW., Dec. 2009, at 10, 12, 14 (noting special ethical constraints on government lawyers and that 
generally, the client is the government, not the individual government official); see also Owen v. City 
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (holding that local governments do not have qualified 
immunity from liability under § 1983).  
327 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
328 See, e.g., Kijonka, 363 F.3d at 648 (including as a defendant the lawyer who gave the advice); 
Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1495–96 (8th Cir. 1987) (same). 
329 See, e.g., Kijonka, 363 F.3d at 648. 
330 See, e.g., id. (holding that prosecutor was not entitled to qualified immunity for an erroneous 
interpretation of law, but police officer was entitled to qualified immunity for reasonably relying on 
prosecutor’s advice). 
331 See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495–96 (1991) (holding that prosecutors are not entitled 
to absolute immunity for legal advice to police). 
332 But see, e.g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 71–72 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving a lawyer’s advice 
about whether a prosecution could be brought in light of the statute of limitations).  
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then the municipality itself could be held liable under the Court’s Monell 
doctrine.333 Moreover, under this Article’s proposed framework in Part IV, 
some of the factors that tend to favor a conclusion that an officer’s reliance 
on advice was reasonable are also factors that would tend to make local 
government liability more likely. For example, if the lawyer giving the 
advice was sufficiently high ranking, that might make it more reasonable 
for the officer to rely, but it would also give the plaintiff a stronger 
argument that the advice amounted to government policy, so that the 
government itself could be liable.334 
B. Lawyers’ Advice Should Be Analyzed for Reasonableness, Not 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
If lawyers’ advice is relevant to qualified immunity analysis, the next 
question is how to decide when the advice supports the qualified immunity 
defense. The two main approaches in the circuits are to analyze it under the 
normal qualified immunity reasonableness analysis, or under an 
extraordinary circumstances exception.335 The better approach is to make it 
part of the basic qualified immunity reasonableness analysis. 
1. Doctrinal Consistency.—First, the reasonableness approach better 
fits the Supreme Court’s development of qualified immunity doctrine, 
which has focused on reasonableness in the circumstances and abandoned 
Harlow’s extraordinary circumstances dicta.336 Since Anderson v. 
Creighton, and with increasing strength over time, the Court has 
emphasized that the key focus of the qualified immunity analysis is on 
objective reasonableness in the circumstances confronted by the officer.337 
Just as important, the Court has never alluded to, much less applied, 
Harlow’s extraordinary circumstances dicta.338 The Court’s overall focus on 
objective reasonableness in the circumstances is inconsistent with an 
approach that creates a special, undefined exception for extraordinary 
circumstances that revives the mixed objective/subjective test of the pre-
 
333 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). If the officer was a state officer, 
however, the government would be wholly immune.  
334 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (holding that a city may be held 
liable for a decision made by an official with authority to make policy for the city); see also, e.g., Sueiro 
Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 234–35 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving a high-ranking 
lawyer giving advice); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 
1990) (same). 
335 See supra Section II.B (examining the circuit split).  
336 See 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). 
337 See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (“Harlow . . . rejected the inquiry into 
state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard.”). 
338 Greabe, supra note 96, at 11.  
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Harlow cases.339 Messerschmidt confirms this trend: both the majority and 
the dissent considered the relevance of the lawyer’s advice without any 
reference to potential extraordinary circumstances.340 The doctrine has 
moved away from the idea of extraordinary circumstances towards a 
holistic consideration of reasonableness under all the circumstances, and 
this trend should extend to the special scenario of lawyers’ advice. 
2. Sound Policy.—Second, the reasonableness approach better fits 
the policies that support courts’ consideration of lawyers’ advice in 
qualified immunity analysis. Relegating lawyers’ advice to an 
extraordinary circumstances exception suggests that seeking lawyers’ 
advice should be helpful only in extraordinary cases.341 But in fact, seeking 
lawyers’ advice both is and should be ordinary. The extraordinary 
circumstances courts actually have noted the first point—that lawyers’ 
advice is routine—but have used it to justify a rule that lawyers’ advice can 
only rarely support immunity, since Harlow “requires” circumstances that 
are “extraordinary.”342 This reasoning has it backwards. Seeking advice is 
ordinary, and it should be encouraged, so the test for whether it supports 
qualified immunity should be whether the officer was reasonable in the 
circumstances to trust the lawyer’s judgment over his own. Sometimes this 
test will be met, and others not, but relegating lawyers’ advice to an 
extraordinary circumstances exception does not recognize the strong policy 
justifications for a rule that encourages and rewards officers who seek and 
reasonably rely on legal advice for difficult questions.343 
3. Analytical Simplicity and Judicial Efficiency.—Third, the 
reasonableness approach simplifies in two ways a test that is widely 
recognized as confusing: it eliminates an extra step of analysis, and it 
prevents the injection of a subjective element into what is supposed to be 
an objective analysis. It is widely recognized that qualified immunity 
doctrine creates confusion among circuit courts,344 and the discussion above 
has shown the uncertainty regarding how to analyze lawyers’ advice in 
 
339 See, e.g., Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 
1987) (suggesting that the extraordinary circumstances exception is a subjective exception to the 
general objective rule); McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1984) (same). 
340 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012); id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 1259–60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
341 See, e.g., Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006). 
342 See, e.g., Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1998) (“It is hardly unusual, let 
alone extraordinary, for public officers to seek legal advice.”); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[F]ew things in government are more common than the 
receipt of legal advice.”).  
343 See supra Section III.B.2.  
344 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 72, at 447; see also Jeffries, supra note 129, at 854.  
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particular.345 Taking lawyers’ advice out of the category of extraordinary 
circumstances and allowing it to be considered with other circumstances of 
the case will simplify the analysis by removing a special and complicated 
extra step. Moreover, the specific framework proposed in Part IV of this 
Article would further streamline and clarify how it is that lawyers’ advice 
fits with qualified immunity. 
Including lawyers’ advice in the basic qualified immunity 
reasonableness analysis will also eliminate confusion by making clear that 
advice is relevant only to the officer’s objective reasonableness, and not to 
the officer’s subjective state of mind. Harlow’s own brief, cryptic 
discussion of extraordinary circumstances in dicta is at the root of this 
confusion.346 In the same breath, the Court both said that the extraordinary 
circumstances exception requires an officer to show they neither “knew nor 
should have known of the relevant legal standard” (i.e., a subjective test), 
and that “again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.”347 
The “mysterious” Harlow dicta348 has produced confusion in the circuits, 
which sometimes seem to treat extraordinary circumstances as subjective, 
and sometimes as purely objective.349 It is possible to read extraordinary 
circumstances as a purely objective test,350 but the phrase and cases 
applying it demonstrate confusion about whether the exception is objective 
or subjective.351 Analyzing lawyers’ advice under the basic reasonableness 
test will eliminate this confusion. 
Relatedly, this approach also will make it easier and more likely to 
resolve the defense on summary judgment. The Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, so it is 
important for the qualified immunity test to allow cases to be resolved early 
in the litigation whenever possible.352 But courts considering lawyers’ 
 
345 See supra Section II.B. 
346 Greabe, supra note 96, at 11. 
347 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).  
348 Greabe, supra note 96, at 11. 
349 See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 836 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing Harlow’s 
extraordinary circumstances dicta as “cryptic[],” but reading it to “allow[] the use of evidence 
concerning subjective motivation if it benefits the government”), vacated, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Floyd 
v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 4 n.1 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that the extraordinary circumstances exception 
might mean “that the Court [in Harlow] did not mean to entirely eliminate from consideration actual 
‘subjective’ knowledge of constitutional standards”); McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the extraordinary circumstances exception left a limited role for subjective 
knowledge in qualified immunity analysis). 
350 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 39, at 519 (“Harlow’s qualified immunity involves only an 
objective component that can usually be resolved by summary judgment at the pleadings stage.”). 
351 See Greabe, supra note 96, at 11 (noting tension between generally objective qualified 
immunity test and seemingly subjective extraordinary circumstances exception).  
352 E.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
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advice under extraordinary circumstances, perhaps because they take the 
test to be subjective, sometimes conclude that invoking lawyers’ advice as 
a basis for the defense creates fact issues that cannot be resolved at 
summary judgment.353 Clarifying that the test for evaluating lawyers’ 
advice is the same basic reasonableness test as under normal qualified 
immunity analysis will signal to courts that the issue can be resolved at 
summary judgment.354 
4. Responses to Counterarguments.—The two main arguments 
against the reasonableness approach and in favor of extraordinary 
circumstances are that Harlow itself requires the extraordinary 
circumstances approach, and that the extraordinary circumstances approach 
is required to preserve the valuable Harlow presumption that a reasonable 
officer should know clearly established law. With regard to the first point, 
Harlow’s discussion of the extraordinary circumstances exception is purely 
dicta, and the Court has never applied or elaborated on it.355 It is 
understandable why some circuits have built an extraordinary 
circumstances doctrine on that dicta,356 but the fact that the Court has not 
used the exception in any of its long line of qualified immunity cases since 
Harlow strongly suggests that Harlow’s extraordinary circumstances 
approach is outmoded and perhaps even disapproved.357 
The second, more compelling objection is that Harlow’s extraordinary 
circumstances exception is required to preserve the Harlow presumption 
that a reasonable officer should know clearly established law because the 
Court established both in the same paragraph of discussion.358 Under this 
view, if the extraordinary circumstances exception is discarded, so too will 
be the valuable general rule that a reasonable officer knows clearly 
established law. But in fact, the extraordinary circumstances label for 
lawyers’ advice cases is not needed to preserve that fiction in the mine-run 
of cases.359 Instead, this Article’s proposed threshold questions can ensure 
that lawyers’ advice only factors into reasonableness analysis in cases that 
meet the necessary preconditions that could allow a court to conclude that 
 
353 See, e.g., Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 
1987).  
354 This is not to say that it always will be resolved at summary judgment—sometimes there will be 
fact questions about whether the officer is entitled to rely on the advice. See, e.g., Slone v. Herman, 
983 F.2d 107, 111 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting reliance on counsel because “[t]he record is not clear . . . as 
to exactly what counsel’s advice was and when it was given”). 
355 See 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); Greabe, supra note 96, at 11.  
356 See, e.g., Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1247 (10th Cir. 2003).  
357 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012).  
358 457 U.S. at 818–19.  
359 See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004).  
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lawyers’ advice alters the normal presumption.360 Further, they do so 
without the rhetorical baggage of a phrase that leads courts to think that 
reliance on lawyers’ advice can only support immunity in the rare or 
extraordinary case.361 
C. The Test Should Be Neutral, Not Presumptive 
1. Neutral, Not Presumptive.—The test for weighing lawyers’ advice 
in qualified immunity analysis should be neutral, neither presuming 
immunity for reliance on legal advice362 nor presuming that immunity is 
“extraordinary.”363 The relevance of lawyers’ advice should be evaluated 
under a neutral reasonableness test like the one proposed in Part IV of this 
Article, but only after the officer meets the screening burden of the 
threshold questions. 
Sometimes an officer will be reasonable under the circumstances to 
rely on lawyers’ advice.364 But presumptively granting immunity simply for 
speaking to a lawyer goes too far by creating bad incentives for officers to 
seek “legal advice” based on limited or incomplete facts, and by 
incentivizing collusion among lawyers and officers to push the envelope of 
legal conduct.365 If merely seeking lawyers’ advice presumptively confers 
immunity, then a lawyer can simply tell the officer, “looks good,” 
presumptively immunizing the officer. The officer could then evade 
responsibility by relying on the advice, while the lawyer could evade 
responsibility by claiming she did not know all the relevant facts.366 
Further, a presumption could wrongly sweep into the immunity basket 
cases in which the officer was not at all justified in relying on the advice—
cases designed to be screened out by the threshold questions in this 
Article’s proposed framework.367 
Neither should there be a presumption that lawyers’ advice will only 
rarely support the defense in extraordinary circumstances.368 While an 
officer should be required to demonstrate certain preconditions for relying 
on the advice, once he does so, the better approach is to neutrally analyze 
whether the officer was reasonable in relying on the advice. A searching 
 
360 See infra Section IV.A.  
361 See, e.g., Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006). 
362 E.g., Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010).  
363 E.g., Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 318. 
364 See supra Section III.B; infra Part IV.  
365 See supra Section III.A.4.d. 
366 See Recent Case, supra note 236, at 2086–87 (criticizing the Kelly I presumption).  
367 See infra Section IV.A. 
368 E.g., Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 318. 
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reasonableness analysis will better ensure that officers seek legal advice in 
the right way, and that they only rely on it when it is reasonable in the 
circumstances, without imposing a rule that makes it mostly fruitless to 
seek advice because of a thumb on the scale presuming that reliance on 
legal advice can support the defense only in rare extraordinary 
circumstances.369 
More broadly, it is unhelpful (though tempting) to overgeneralize by 
saying that lawyers’ advice has a tendency to strongly or weakly support 
qualified immunity.370 The better approach is to disregard generalizations, 
and evaluate the relevance of lawyers’ advice with careful attention to 
whether reliance on that advice was reasonable in the circumstances of the 
particular case.371 This is more consistent with the Court’s repeated 
instruction that the qualified immunity reasonableness analysis must focus 
on the circumstances of each individual case.372 Nor does taking a neutral 
approach mean that officers can escape the Harlow presumption merely by 
mentioning legal advice. The Harlow presumption generally makes 
sense—a reasonable officer should be presumed to know clearly 
established law.373 But the proposed threshold questions, on which the 
officer would have the burden, adequately screen for cases in which a court 
should neutrally consider lawyers’ advice as part of the reasonableness 
analysis. The proposed approach avoids the downsides of a presumption for 
or against immunity, while still requiring the officer to carry the burden of 
overcoming the Harlow presumption that a reasonable officer knows 
clearly established law. 
IV. PROPOSED TEST FOR EVALUATING THE REASONABLENESS OF 
OFFICERS’ RELIANCE ON LAWYERS’ ADVICE 
This Part proposes a specific test for courts to use in evaluating 
whether an officer’s reliance on lawyers’ advice was reasonable, and 
justifies the test as most consistent with modern qualified immunity 
doctrine, the circuits’ approaches, and the policy concerns which qualified 
immunity doctrine seeks to balance. Through a framework of threshold 
questions and balancing factors, the proposed test applies a searching 
reasonableness analysis to identify those cases in which an officer’s 
 
369 E.g., Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2011). 
370 See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text. 
371 See Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004).  
372 E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“[I]n the end we must still slosh our way 
through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”). 
373 See Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Police officers generally have a duty to know 
the basic elements of the laws they enforce.”). 
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reliance on lawyers’ advice should support her qualified immunity defense. 
This Part sets out threshold questions and balancing factors, and explains 
how they work together to screen out cases where lawyers’ advice should 
have no weight at all, and then identify cases in which an officer’s reliance 
on advice was reasonable. 
Before examining the framework in detail, it is worth explaining 
briefly why a specific framework is preferable to merely considering legal 
advice as “part of the mix” of qualified immunity analysis.374  As noted, 
some circuits use a multifactor approach to assess whether lawyers’ advice 
supports qualified immunity, while others take a looser approach that 
considers the advice in the general mix of the court’s reasonableness 
analysis.375 This Article proposes a specific, detailed framework because a 
specific test will improve judicial consistency, increase predictability for 
officers, and assist litigation strategy for plaintiffs. In addition, since both 
the threshold questions and the balancing factors are drawn from factors 
actually considered in decisions of the circuit courts,376 there is doctrinal 
support for synthesizing them into a comprehensive test. 
First, applying a specific framework will improve consistency across 
the large set of cases raising the lawyers’-advice question. As noted, the 
circuits’ approaches to this issue are in disarray, not only between the 
circuits but also between panels of the same circuit.377 Adopting a specific 
test will help to achieve more consistent results as the courts apply it in a 
series of cases. 
Second, applying a specific framework will also increase 
predictability for officers, who will better know what they need to do to 
secure a legal opinion that will favor immunity.378 For example, if it is 
emphasized that legal advice is irrelevant when secured after acting,379 
officers will know to seek advice in advance (when it may help to prevent a 
potential violation of someone’s rights).380 And, if it is clear that the 
opinion must be based on all the relevant facts, and will more likely 
support immunity if it is specific and detailed, officers will know to seek 
considered legal opinions rather than simply seeking “cover” through a 
lawyer’s blessing. 
 
374 See Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009). 
375 See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text.  
376 See infra Sections IV.A.1, IV.B.1.  
377 See supra Section II.B.  
378 See Spector, supra note 278, at 10, 12 (examining specific qualified immunity decisions on 
lawyer’s advice for guidance on how officer’s should go about seeking advice). 
379 See, e.g., Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988). 
380 See, e.g., Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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Finally, applying a specific framework will help plaintiffs shape their 
discovery to challenge the officer’s reliance on counsel.381 Current qualified 
immunity doctrine is generally and correctly regarded as quite officer 
friendly.382 This Article has argued that, in the case of reliance of legal 
advice, there are actually good reasons for allowing it to support the 
officer’s defense when the officer’s reliance is reasonable.383 But a specific 
framework for analyzing the issue will help plaintiffs test through 
discovery whether the officer’s reliance was actually reasonable, and serve 
as a check on circuit courts simply using legal advice as yet another tool to 
throw out plaintiffs’ cases on qualified immunity grounds. 
A. Threshold Questions  
1. The Three Threshold Questions.—In considering whether receipt 
of lawyers’ advice supports an officer’s qualified immunity defense, the 
court should begin by analyzing three threshold questions.384 The first 
question is whether the officer accurately and completely described the 
relevant facts to the lawyer.385 The second is whether the lawyer actually 
advised the officer that the officer’s contemplated conduct was 
constitutional.386 The third is whether the officer actually followed, and did 
not exceed, the lawyer’s advice—which also requires a showing that the 
advice was given before the challenged conduct.387 If the answer to any of 
these questions is “no,” then the receipt of legal advice should do nothing 
to support the officer’s qualified immunity defense. Further, the defendant 
officer should have the burden of persuasion on these questions.388 This 
means that if, as in most cases, the qualified immunity defense is raised on 
 
381 See Messerschmidt Transcript, supra note †, at 41 (respondent’s counsel noting that the record 
did not show “what transpired in these conversations with the deputy district attorney”).  
382 See, e.g., Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 78.  
383 See supra Sections III.A–B.  
384 This Article assumes that if an officer raises lawyers’ advice as a defense, attorney–client 
privilege either would not apply or would be waived. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 29 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“If the client asserts the lawyer’s advice as a defense, 
however, it waives the privilege.” (citation omitted)). Whether and when privilege would apply, or 
could be pierced, is beyond this Article’s scope. However, if an officer invokes lawyers’ advice, but for 
some reason privilege is upheld as to what the lawyer advised, the court should ignore the advice in the 
qualified immunity analysis. Cf. In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that 
attorney–client privilege was not waived because lawyers’ advice was irrelevant to the qualified 
immunity analysis).  
385 See, e.g., Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 882–83 (8th Cir. 2000). 
386 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005). 
387 See, e.g., Kinkade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 399 (8th Cir. 1995). 
388 See generally Duvall, supra note 77 (discussing burdens of proof and persuasion in qualified 
immunity analysis).  
DAWSON (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 10:38 PM 
110:525 (2016) Qualified Immunity for Lawyers’ Advice 
577 
summary judgment,389 immunity should be denied if there is an absence of 
evidence or a material fact question about the answer to any of these 
threshold questions.390 This also means that, if the officer wishes to rely on 
lawyers’ advice as a summary judgment defense, the judge should allow 
discovery into the content and circumstances surrounding the legal advice. 
First, the officer must give the lawyer all relevant facts—and must not 
misrepresent those facts—to be able to rely on the lawyer’s advice to 
support a qualified immunity defense.391 As courts have noted, “[a] 
reasonable officer would not rely on a district attorney’s assent, when he 
knew the district attorney had not been given the material information.”392 
Whether the officer fully advised the lawyer will be a context-specific 
inquiry that depends on the particular legal standard at issue and the facts in 
the summary judgment record.393 But this threshold would not be met if, for 
example, officers seeking advice for probable cause to arrest fail to tell the 
lawyer that an eyewitness description did not match the suspect’s 
appearance,394 if an officer seeking advice on whether he may fire an 
employee fails to tell the attorney about the content of the employee’s 
speech,395 or if an officer simply provides the lawyer with false 
information.396 
Second, the lawyer must actually advise the officer that the 
contemplated action is constitutional, or at least that it is not clearly 
unconstitutional.397 In some circumstances, this threshold question will be 
trivial because the advice sought by the officer basically is the answer to 
the constitutional question—e.g., whether there is probable cause to 
 
389 Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that qualified immunity is 
usually raised at summary judgment after limited discovery); see also Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 
434 F.3d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that qualified immunity is usually resolved before trial).  
390 See, e.g., Kinkade, 64 F.3d at 399 (concluding that attorney’s advice could not support summary 
judgment on qualified immunity when “a factual dispute remains about whether counsel’s advice was 
given before or after [defendant] voted to terminate [plaintiff]”).  
391 See, e.g., Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1015 (rejecting qualified immunity based on advice of 
counsel where officer either failed to give lawyer all relevant facts or misrepresented facts); Suboh v. 
Dist. Att’y’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 882–
83 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 495 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); see also 
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012) (upholding immunity when “[t]he only facts 
omitted . . . would only have strengthened the warrant”).  
392 Suboh, 298 F.3d at 97.  
393 See, e.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249 (noting that the only omitted facts were ones that 
would have actually strengthened probable cause).  
394 Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1015 (describing facts given lawyer as “incomplete and one-sided”).  
395 Belk, 228 F.3d at 882–83. 
396 Burk, 948 F.2d at 495; see also Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 
1487, 1496 (8th Cir. 1987) (lawyer’s advice was “somewhat equivocal”). 
397 See, e.g., Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988).  
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arrest.398 In other circumstances, however, this threshold question will be 
important. For example, if in an employee-termination scenario the lawyer 
advises a supervisory officer that the supervisor has contractual power to 
fire an employee, but says nothing about whether the firing would violate 
the employee’s First or Fourteenth Amendment rights, then the lawyer 
would not have actually advised the supervisor that his conduct is 
constitutional.399 Or, if the lawyer merely chats with the officer about the 
situation generally, but does not tell the officer that the proposed conduct is 
legal, then the lawyer’s advice should drop out of the analysis.400 Finally, if 
the official simply lies about the lawyer having approved the actions, the 
defense should fail.401 On the other hand, it is possible that the lawyer might 
specifically advise the officer that the law is unsettled, and that the case at 
hand could be a good “test case” about the content of the law.402 In that 
case, so long as the lawyer actually provided specific advice about the 
constitutional question, the threshold question would be met—since an 
officer could reasonably believe the law was not clearly established if a 
lawyer specifically advised her so. 
Third, the officer must actually follow the lawyer’s advice. If the 
lawyer advises one way but the officer acts another, the fact that the officer 
spoke to the lawyer cannot support the officer’s qualified immunity 
defense.403 Indeed, in some circumstances, if the lawyer correctly advised 
that the proposed conduct violated clearly established law, the advice could 
defeat the officer’s defense by showing that a reasonable officer could not 
have believed the conduct would be legal.404 Relatedly, the officer must 
also “follow” the advice in the sense that the advice must have been given 
before the officer engaged in the conduct. A lawyer’s “blessing” of conduct 
after the fact should be irrelevant to whether a reasonable officer at the time 
 
398 See, e.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250.  
399 See Johnston, 850 F.2d at 596. 
400 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a lawyers’ advice 
defense when the attorney told the officer seizure was statutorily authorized, but “never once discussed 
the applicable constitutional law” requiring a warrant or notice and hearing). 
401 See, e.g., Borges Colón v. Román-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006).  
402 Thanks to Brian Scott for relating a real-world experience with this scenario.  
403 Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1998) (“A public official who fails to follow 
legal advice obviously cannot rely on that advice to establish entitlement to qualified immunity.” 
(emphasis removed)).  
404 E.g., Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting reliance on 
advice when the record suggested that counsel’s advice to defendant was “that its actions to that point 
had not been legally acceptable”); see also Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1015 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (noting that before officers approached a state’s attorney, FBI officials were told by a United 
States Attorney that there was no probable cause to arrest).  
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of the conduct would have thought the conduct did not violate clearly 
established law.405 
2. Justifications for the Threshold Questions.—The threshold 
questions of the proposed test are designed to eliminate cases in which the 
officer’s reliance on legal advice should carry no weight towards 
supporting the officer’s qualified immunity defense. Each of them is 
intended to eliminate cases in which an officer’s reliance on legal advice 
categorically should be unreasonable. Further, each of them, like the 
overall principle of considering lawyers’ advice, draws support from 
common law. 
First, if the officer misleads the lawyer or omits crucial facts, then a 
court cannot conclude that an objectively reasonable officer could have 
reasonably relied on the lawyer’s advice, and the lawyer’s advice should be 
given no weight.406 It is unreasonable for an officer to rely on the lawyer’s 
opinion when the officer knows important facts relevant to the legal 
question the officer is asking about that the lawyer does not.407 This 
threshold bar is also justified by good policy—given the incentives for 
officers to provide incomplete information to get the “right” answer, a 
strong rule is needed that simply cuts the legal advice out of the case if the 
officer was not forthright about the material facts.408 
Second, if the lawyer does not specifically advise the officer that the 
conduct is constitutional, then that advice cannot establish that a reasonable 
officer under the circumstances would have relied on the advice. As 
discussed, officers are generally presumed to know the contents of clearly 
established law, and while this may be a fiction, it is generally a valuable 
fiction.409 It should be able to be overcome by the officer’s reliance on legal 
advice only when the legal advice specifically instructs the officer that the 
intended conduct is constitutional, or that the constitutional question is 
open.410 If the lawyer’s advice is not directed to the constitutional issue, 
then it is irrelevant to the key question of whether a reasonable officer 
 
405 So, for example, in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, the lawyer’s advice over the phone to the 
officer should weigh in the qualified immunity analysis, but the post-arrest memo concluding there had 
been probable cause for the arrest should not. 622 F.3d 248, 251–52 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Lindsey v. 
City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting reliance on lawyer’s advice that was 
sought after the challenged action had already been taken); Charfauros, 249 F.3d at 954 (same); 
Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 
406 See, e.g., Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1015; see also supra notes 391–96 and accompanying text. 
407 See, e.g., Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 495 (8th Cir. 1991). 
408 See Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1015–16. 
409 See Kelly III, 544 F. App’x 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2013). 
410 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a lawyers’ advice 
defense when the attorney “never once discussed the applicable constitutional law”). 
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could have believed that her conduct would not violate clearly established 
law.411 This may mean that the lawyer’s advice is relevant to the defense on 
some claims, but not others. For example, in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 
the lawyer advised the police officer that there was probable cause to arrest 
under Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act (i.e., that it would not violate the Fourth 
Amendment to arrest Kelly), but did not advise the officer as to whether the 
Wiretap Act violated clearly established First Amendment law.412 Thus, the 
lawyer’s advice could be considered relevant to qualified immunity only as 
to the Fourth Amendment claim, but not the First Amendment claim.413 
Third, to rely on lawyers’ advice in establishing qualified immunity, 
the officer must follow the advice, both in the sense that the officer’s 
conduct must align with the advice, and that the conduct must 
chronologically follow the advice.414 If the officer acts in a way that goes 
beyond or differs from what the lawyer advised the law would allow, then a 
reasonable officer could not have believed that the lawyer’s advice 
supported her belief that her conduct would not have violated clearly 
established law.415 And, if the advice was received only after the officer 
took the challenged action, it can have no relevance to whether a 
reasonable officer would have thought, at the time she acted, that her 
conduct would not violate clearly established law.416 
In addition to the logical reasons for requiring these threshold 
questions be met before an officer can argue that a lawyer’s advice 
supports her qualified immunity defense, the threshold questions are 
supported by common law.417 At common law, just as under the proposed 
framework, the advice-of-counsel defense generally requires that (1) the 
client provided the lawyer with all the relevant facts, (2) the advice actually 
authorized the conduct, and (3) the client actually followed the advice.418 
 
411 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982). 
412 622 F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). 
413 See id. at 262 (analyzing the First Amendment claim without reference to prosecutor’s advice).  
414 See supra notes 403–05 and accompanying text.  
415 See, e.g., Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1998). 
416 See, e.g., Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2007). 
417 See supra Section III.A.3 (justifying reliance on lawyers’ advice by common law analogs).  
418 E.g., United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In order to establish an advice 
of counsel defense, a defendant must establish that: ‘(1) before taking action, (2) he in good faith sought 
the advice of an attorney whom he considered competent, (3) for the purpose of securing advice on the 
lawfulness of his possible future conduct, (4) and made a full and accurate report to his attorney of all 
material facts which the defendant knew, (5) and acted strictly in accordance with the advice of his 
attorney who had been given a full report.’” (quoting Liss v. United States, 915 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 
1990))); C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The elements of [the 
advice-of-counsel] defense require a showing of 1) a request for advice of counsel on the legality of a 
proposed action, 2) full disclosure of the relevant facts to counsel, 3) receipt of advice from counsel that 
the action to be taken will be legal, and 4) reliance in good faith on counsel’s advice.”). 
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Finally, both by illustration of how the test would work and to address 
possible concerns about the threshold questions imposing too high a burden 
on plaintiffs, it is important to note that under the proposed test, at 
summary judgment (the context in which qualified immunity is usually 
litigated)419 all a plaintiff need do is show that there is a fact question about 
whether the officer meets the criteria. For example, if the record 
demonstrates a genuine, material fact question about whether the officer 
gave the lawyer all the relevant facts,420 then the officer should not be 
entitled to qualified immunity on the basis of being advised by the lawyer 
that the conduct is constitutional. The same is true of the other threshold 
questions. 
B. Proposed Framework: Five Balancing Factors 
If the officer clears the threshold questions, then the court should 
weigh five factors to decide whether a reasonable officer could have 
concluded, based on the lawyer’s advice, that her contemplated conduct 
would not violate clearly established law. These factors include (1) the 
specificity and detail of the advice, (2) the expertise and authority of the 
lawyer to give the advice, (3) whether the legal issue would have been 
novel or unusual to an officer in the defendant’s position, (4) the extent to 
which the lawyer was independent from the defendant, and (5) the 
complexity and difficulty of the legal question in light of the law at the 
time. If examination of these factors demonstrates that it was reasonable for 
the officer to rely on the lawyer’s advice that the contemplated conduct was 
not illegal, then the officer should be entitled to qualified immunity. No 
special burden would apply to the evaluation of these factors; they would 
be considered as part of the court’s overall analysis of whether a reasonable 
officer would not have known their conduct would violate clearly 
established law.421 
1. The Five Balancing Factors.—The first factor weighs the 
specificity and detail of the advice given. The more specific and detailed 
the attorney’s advice, the more likely that an officer will be reasonable in 
 
419 Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that qualified immunity is 
usually raised at summary judgment after limited discovery). 
420 See, e.g., Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
summary judgment on immunity when “the record is susceptible to the view that the officers 
themselves realized the weakness of their case, and therefore manipulated the available evidence to 
mislead the state prosecutor into authorizing [plaintiff]’s arrest”).  
421 See Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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relying on it.422 So, for example, if an attorney simply initials a warrant 
application to indicate approval,423 that would carry less weight than if the 
record shows that the lawyer discussed the case with the officer in detail, 
and explained the legal issues before advising the officer that the proposed 
conduct would be legal.424 Similarly, if the attorney produced a written 
memo endorsing the legality of the actions before the officer actually acted, 
that would bolster the officer’s argument that she was reasonable to rely on 
the lawyer’s advice.425 The evaluation of whether the advice was “specific 
and detailed” will turn on the specific factual record assembled to show 
what the attorney actually advised.426 If the record shows nothing specific 
about the lawyer’s advice, this factor will weigh against immunity.427 
Similarly, an officer will be more reasonable to rely on the lawyer’s 
advice when the lawyer has expertise and authority to answer the legal 
question presented. So, for example, if the lawyer consulted by the officer 
is a prosecutor assigned to the narcotics division specifically to give advice 
about searches,428 then that fact will tend to indicate the officer is 
reasonable to rely on the lawyer’s opinion that a proposed search will be 
legal. Also, if the lawyer giving advice is high up in the legal hierarchy of 
the government entity, the officer’s argument that it was reasonable to rely 
will be stronger.429 If, on the other hand, a government official trying to 
decide whether to fire an employee consults an outside lawyer with no 
special expertise in that area of law or authority to provide opinions for the 
government, that would carry less weight towards showing that the officer 
was reasonable to rely on the lawyer’s advice.430 
 
422 See, e.g., Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (advice supporting immunity 
when a lawyer gave officers precise advice about use of tape that accounted for circumstances in which 
it was made and in which police had received it). 
423 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1243 (2012). 
424 See, e.g., Davis, 149 F.3d at 620 (focusing on the fact that the lawyer’s advice was specific and 
detailed); Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 741 (10th Cir. 1997) (same). 
425 See, e.g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1988) (officers requested memo from the 
Medicaid Fraud Unit on the statute of limitations before executing search warrants and initiating 
prosecution).  
426 See, e.g., Tanner v. Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[T]here should be detailed 
information as to whether and when such advice was given and the degree of mature consideration 
accorded the matter by the Assistant Attorney General . . . who gave the advice.”). 
427 See, e.g., Slone v. Herman, 983 F.2d 107, 111 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting reliance on counsel 
because “[t]he record is not clear . . . as to exactly what counsel’s advice was and when it was given”). 
428 Davis, 149 F.3d at 620. 
429 See, e.g., Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving 
advice from “Puerto Rico’s chief legal officer”); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving advice from “high-ranking government attorneys”). 
430 See, e.g., Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 
1987) (involving a lawyer who was defendant’s private attorney with no special expertise on 
constitutionality of attachment statutes). 
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Third, a court should consider whether the legal issue confronted by 
the officer was within the core or at the periphery of the duties of similarly 
situated officers. So, for example, a gang crimes detective, with over a 
decade of experience and specialized training in investigating gang-related 
crimes431 should be less able to claim reasonable reliance on a lawyer’s 
opinion about probable cause to search a suspected gang member’s house 
than an environmental regulator who is not accustomed to searching and 
seizing property and seeks a lawyer’s advice before going onto private 
property to test for contamination.432 This factor recognizes that it will be 
more reasonable for an officer to rely on legal advice—that is, to trust the 
lawyer’s opinion over her own—when the legal question is beyond the 
normal scope of the officer’s duties. 
Also relevant is the degree to which the lawyer is independent from 
the officer,433 which has two aspects. One is whether the lawyer, like the 
officer, has a shared interest in taking the debatable action. For example if 
the lawyer is on the same prosecution “team” as the officer, it will be less 
reasonable for the officer to simply rely on the lawyer’s legal advice, since 
the lawyer and the officer share closely an interest in pushing the law to 
make arrests and secure convictions.434 On the other hand, the more the 
lawyer’s role is to provide neutral legal advice, the more likely the officer 
will be reasonable to rely on it. It is true that almost always the attorney 
will have some degree of shared interest with the officer—either because 
both are government employees or because the officer is a private lawyer’s 
client, retaining the lawyer to give legal advice. But cases can be placed on 
a spectrum in terms of the alignment of the officer’s and the lawyer’s 
incentives to approve the contemplated action. Relatedly, if the lawyer is 
actually subordinate to the government officer who seeks the advice, the 
lawyer will have a very obvious interest in approving the proposed action, 
which will make it presumptively less reasonable for the officer to rely on 
the lawyer’s legal advice.435 
Finally, reliance on lawyers’ advice will be more reasonable if the 
legal question is complex or the clearly established analysis is close: 
“[W]here the application of the law to the facts falls on the hazy border 
 
431 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2012); see also Friedman v. Boucher, 
580 F.3d 847, 859 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a police officer is acquainted with the controlling law and 
does not need the advice of counsel to assess the legality of his actions, statements made by a 
prosecutor will not shield the officer from liability if he then violates the law.”). 
432 See V–1 Oil Co., 902 F.2d at 1484. 
433 See Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988).  
434 See Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249. 
435 See Johnston, 850 F.2d at 596.  
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between clear and ambiguous, the officer’s consultation with an attorney 
prior to making the arrest may become relevant to the [reasonableness] 
calculus.”436 Under this factor, a court may and should consider lawyers’ 
advice together with its examination of the state of the law when evaluating 
whether the officer’s actions were reasonable.437 So, for example, if the 
relevant legal analysis requires applying a complicated balancing test such 
as the Pickering test,438 or if determining what law is “clearly established” 
requires close reading of divergent circuit precedents,439 it is more likely 
that an officer’s reliance on a lawyer’s conclusion about the issue will be 
reasonable. Also, if the applicability of constitutional protection itself turns 
on a complicated legal issue—such as whether an employee is tenured—it 
will be more likely reasonable for the officer to rely on a lawyer’s answer 
to that question.440 However, if the officer’s planned course of action is 
unquestionably beyond the pale of what the law allows, the lawyer’s advice 
will not magically render the officer’s action reasonable.441 
Under this test, then, lawyers’ advice may act as a balance-tipping 
factor in the reasonableness analysis when the court believes there is a 
close question as to whether the officer’s conduct violated clearly 
established law.442 If the court itself believes the question whether the 
action was prohibited by clearly established law is close, then it should 
conclude that the officer’s decision to seek legal advice tips the scale 
towards an overall conclusion that a reasonable officer would not have 
known that her conduct would violate clearly established law. 
In weighing these factors, there should neither be a presumption that 
lawyers’ advice entitles the officer to immunity,443 nor a thumb on the scale 
 
436 Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009). 
437 See, e.g., Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 286 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that county attorney’s 
advice, together with new procedural rules and lack of clear federal case law on postjudgment 
deprivation of real property, supported conclusion that a reasonable officer would not have understood 
the conduct at issue would violate plaintiff’s rights); L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 
879, 888 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that legal advice together with “a complex and uncertain legal issue” 
supported immunity).  
438 See, e.g., Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 739–43 (8th Cir. 2014). 
439 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381–83 (2014). 
440 See, e.g., Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 896 (6th Cir. 2006) (involving a 
difficult legal question about an employee’s legal status under state law); Tubbesing v. Arnold, 
742 F.2d 401, 406–07 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); Wentz v. Klecker, 721 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(same).  
441 See, e.g., Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Cox v. Hainey, 
391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that “a wave of the prosecutor’s wand cannot magically” confer 
immunity). 
442 See, e.g., Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009); Revis, 489 F.3d at 286; 
L.A. Police Protective League, 907 F.2d at 888. 
443 E.g., Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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against immunity on the grounds that lawyers’ advice can only support the 
officer’s reasonableness argument in a rare or “extraordinary” case.444 
Instead, the court should simply analyze, using the framework above, the 
question whether a reasonable officer would have relied on the lawyer’s 
advice in concluding that her intended conduct was legal. This analysis 
should be mostly independent from analyzing whether the officer’s conduct 
would have violated clearly established law in the absence of the legal 
advice, except that if that analysis is close, the fifth factor will favor the 
conclusion that the officer is protected by reliance on legal advice.445 
As an illustration of how the proposed test should work, applying the 
test to Messerschmidt suggests that, though the Court likely would have 
reached the same holding,446 the advice of the deputy district attorney 
should not have done very much to support the officer’s qualified immunity 
defense. The officer did not discuss the issue in detail with the lawyer; the 
lawyer merely initialed the warrant application and later testified that this 
indicated agreement that there was probable cause.447 The legal question in 
the case was not particularly thorny; instead, most of the dispute centered 
on the facts supporting the warrant and whether they were sufficient to 
support probable cause under applicable law.448 The lawyer and officer 
were part of the same prosecution “team.”449 The officer himself was an 
experienced detective with a long track record of investigating gang crimes, 
suggesting that an officer in his position would be well-positioned to know 
the applicable law,450 and nothing in the opinion indicated that the attorney 
had special expertise or authority to address the issue. The only factor that 
arguably would cut in the officer’s favor was the fifth factor, but even there 
it seemed the majority’s view was simply that the officer’s view was 
reasonable on the facts,451 not that the relevant law was “on the hazy border 
between clear and ambiguous.”452 
  
 
444 See, e.g., Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006).  
445 See, e.g., Poulakis, 341 F. App’x at 533 (“[Lawyer’s advice] may be an important factor for a 
court to consider when the outcome in the qualified immunity case would otherwise be unclear.”).  
446 The Court independently concluded the officer’s probable cause determination was reasonable; 
moreover, it relied on the approval of the magistrate and the officer’s superiors as supporting immunity. 
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249–50 (2012).  
447 Id. at 1243.  
448 See id. at 1246–49. 
449 Id. at 1249.  
450 Id. at 1255 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
451 See id. at 1247 (majority opinion).  
452 Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 533 (11th Cir. 2009).  
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2. Justifications for the Five Balancing Factors.—The balancing 
factors are designed to assess whether the officer’s reliance on the lawyer’s 
advice was reasonable. Each identifies a circumstance that makes it more 
reasonable for an officer to trust the lawyer’s legal opinion. 
First, the specificity and detail of the advice supports a finding of 
reasonableness if it shows a reasonable officer would have believed that the 
lawyer’s advice was based on an in-depth consideration of the issues at 
hand in the particular case. More specific and detailed advice suggests that 
the lawyer has given the problem “mature consideration”453 and is 
providing advice specifically directed to the legality of the proposed 
conduct.454 
Second, both the expertise and the authority of the advising lawyer 
affect how reasonable it is for the officer to trust the lawyer’s opinion. The 
greater the lawyer’s expertise in that area of the law, the more reasonable it 
will be for the officer to believe the lawyer’s advice is correct.455 As to 
authority, if the lawyer is authorized to give such advice, a reasonable 
officer would have more reason to believe the lawyer knows that area of 
law. Further, if the lawyer is high-ranking, it will be more reasonable for 
the officer to rely on the advice because the lawyer is competent to 
interpret law and make legal decisions for the government entity, and 
because the officer is not in a position to second-guess that lawyer’s 
advice.456  
Third, the independence of the lawyer from the officer supports 
reasonableness because it gives an indication that the officer could 
reasonably trust the lawyer’s judgment on the issue. If the lawyer and 
officer are working “hand in glove” to pursue the same goal,457 then the 
officer will be less reasonable to trust the lawyer’s opinion because the 
officer and the lawyer have similar incentives to push the law to achieve 
the desired result.458 Similarly, if the lawyer is actually the officer’s 
subordinate, a reasonable officer would recognize that this dynamic gives 
the lawyer a natural incentive to provide the answer that the officer would 
 
453 Tanner v. Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir. 1985). 
454 E.g., Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1998).  
455 E.g., id. (involving advice from a lawyer specially detailed to the narcotics division). 
456 See, e.g., Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa de la Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 234–35 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(involving advice given by the chief legal officer of Puerto Rico); V–1 Oil Co. v. Wyo., Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving advice given a by “high-ranking” lawyer). 
457 Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 35 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004).  
458 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012). 
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like to hear.459 On the other hand, if the lawyer is independent from the 
officer, or outranks her, then the officer will be more reasonable to trust the 
lawyer’s judgment about the difficult legal question.460 
Fourth, a court should consider whether the legal issue would have 
been novel or difficult to an officer in the defendant’s position. If the issue 
is one that an officer in the defendant’s position would encounter routinely, 
then it will be less reasonable for the officer to abdicate to a lawyer their 
duty of making an independent judgment.461 But if the legal issue is one 
which an officer in the defendant’s position would be unlikely to regularly 
encounter, it will be more reasonable for the officer to seek and trust a 
lawyer’s opinion about what clearly established law allows.462 
Finally, whether the officer is reasonable to rely on the lawyer’s 
judgment will and should turn in part on whether the underlying legal 
question is complex, difficult, or close. If the law is plain, Harlow directs 
that a reasonable officer should know it, and a defendant officer should be 
held liable for violating it.463 If the law on the underlying legal question is 
indisputably not clearly established, then the officer should be immune 
regardless of having received legal advice.464 If, however, the legal question 
is close, a court should be more likely to conclude that the officer was 
reasonable based on seeking and following legal advice. When the court 
itself thinks the “clearly established” question was close, it should 
recognize that it was reasonable for an officer to be uncertain and therefore 
to seek and rely on legal advice. This fifth factor may be particularly 
important in post-Pearson cases, when the district courts decide to resolve 
the “clearly established” question without deciding whether there was a 
constitutional violation.465 
CONCLUSION 
The best solution to the lawyers’ advice question dividing the circuits 
is to analyze whether a reasonable officer would have relied on the 
 
459 See, e.g., Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988). 
460 See, e.g., V–1 Oil Co., 902 F.2d at 1489.  
461 See, e.g., Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1242 (involving an officer who was a gang detective 
with years of experience serving gang warrants); Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 
1993) (rejecting a reliance-on-counsel argument because defendants were “not unsophisticated litigants, 
and . . . they reasonably should have known” the applicable law).  
462 See, e.g., Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 2014); V–1 Oil Co., 902 F.2d 
at 1484.  
463 See Kelly I, 622 F.3d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Police officers generally have a duty to know 
the basic elements of the laws they enforce.”). 
464 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 245 (2009). 
465 See id. at 236.  
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lawyer’s advice to conclude that her conduct would not violate clearly 
established law. This approach is most consistent with qualified immunity 
doctrine and policy because it balances the need to punish unreasonable 
violations of constitutional rights against the recognition that sometimes a 
reasonable officer’s best course of action will be to seek advice from a 
knowledgeable lawyer—and that encouraging officers to seek advice will 
help reduce violations across the spectrum of cases. The specific 
framework of threshold questions and balancing factors is designed to 
implement these policies by encouraging courts to screen out cases in 
which an officer could not have relied on the advice, and then perform a 
searching reasonableness analysis to determine whether the officer’s 
reliance on legal advice was actually reasonable. The Supreme Court 
should also put to rest Harlow’s extraordinary circumstances dicta, which 
has misled the circuits and needlessly confused qualified immunity 
analysis. 
 
